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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues liberal theories of peace fail to explain the relationship that 
exists between Chile and Peru.  Democratic and Economic Integration theories posit that 
democratization and economic integration foster cooperation.  Yet, these do not 
accurately reflect the current state of relations.  I posit such an explanation must take into 
account the preferences of actors, and their ability to act on those preferences.  I focus on 
the executive, the military and the legislature.  I apply this framework to aspects of Chile-
Peru relations from 1968 to today.  I find that balance of power best defines the period 
1968 to 1980.  Yet, competition is tempered by balance of identity and the nontraditional 
use of confidence building measures.  The period 1980 to 2000 is characterized as an era 
of peaceful relations.  Under various stages of democratization, executives are 
increasingly able to act on their preferences.  Subordination of the military allows them 
freedom to pursue cooperative measures to help legitimize their administrations.  Their 
ability to foster cooperation even reaches to nondemocratic neighbors.  Since 2000, 
bilateral relations have deteriorated despite attempts by executives to strengthen 
cooperation.  This is largely due to constraints placed on Peruvian executives because of 
domestic politics. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In his examination of the history of interstate conflict in the Western hemisphere, 
Jorge Domínguez remarked that “Latin Americans for the most part do not fear 
aggression.”1  Yet, if recent developments in the region dictate, such sentiment may soon 
change.  Consider, for example, the 1995 Cenepa war fought between Peru and Ecuador.  
Tensions over disputed borders between the two states continued to fester in the decades 
following a similar conflict waged in the early 1940s.  Larry Rohter noted at the time that 
the intensely patriotic and nationalistic conflict, though short in duration, “was sufficient 
to send a wave of alarm and resentment throughout Latin America.”2  Indeed, that 
conflict continues to be a stark reminder to more than a dozen other countries in the 
region which are also parties to boundary grievances which could explode at any time.3   
More recently, Colombia’s military operation to eliminate FARC encampments 
within Ecuador’s borders escalated tensions with Venezuela and heightened concerns for 
regional stability.  Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez responded to the Colombian 
campaign by ordering the deployment of ten army battalions to Venezuela’s border with 
Colombia.4  Analysts note that the willingness to engage in such brinkmanship continues 




                                                 
1 Jorge Domínguez, et al., “Boundary Disputes in Latin America,” United States Institute of Peace, 
Peacework 50 (2003): 13. 
2 Larry Rohter, “The World; Bad Fences Make Bad Neighbors,” New York Times, February 5, 1995.  
3 Ibid. 
4 “Latin America: Andean Tensions Fan Instability Fears,” OxResearch, March 6, 2008.  
5 Ibid.  
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Thus, given a historically tense relationship between Chile and Peru, largely 
based upon the contestation of boundary issues dating to the War of the Pacific (1879-
1883), it is important to explore how their dynamic relationship will affect regional 
stability in the future.  I will do this by nuancing several prominent theories of peace and 
cooperation within a traditional political-economy framework.   
B. IMPORTANCE  
As explained by Samuel Huntington, much of the globe witnessed an 
unprecedented trend toward democratization between 1974 and the beginning of the new 
millennium.6  During this period, Latin America was no exception.  In fact, by 1991, 
Haiti and Cuba were the only non-democratic regimes in the entire region.   
An equally remarkable trend also occurred in the economic sphere.  From the 
1970s through the 1990s, many Latin American states experienced rapid, yet sweeping 
transformations to capitalist driven, neo-liberal economies.  The economic debt crisis of 
1982 was, as Michael Reid argues, was “the most serious international financial crisis 
since 1929.”7  Nations suffered from high oil prices, sluggish growth, inflation, an 
increase in interest rates and decreases in non-oil commodity prices.8  The inward 
oriented economy of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) had failed.  Broad 
economic liberalization measures (often referred to as the “Washington Consensus”) led 
to slashed government spending, reduced trade-barriers, and the stabilization of many of 
the struggling economies.  This generally overlapping phenomenon of increased 
democratization and economic liberalization is often referred to as Latin America’s “dual 
transition.” 
Also throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, much of Latin America experienced a 
significant increase in security cooperation.  This was particularly the case in the 
Southern Cone, where once tense interstate relations were replaced by an era of 
                                                 
6 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, The Julian J. 
Rothbaum distinguished lecture series, v. 4 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 2. 
7 Michael Reid, Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul (Lancaster: Yale University 
Press, 2007), 132.  
8 Ibid., 132-133.  
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cooperation and confidence building measures (CBMs).  Numerous border disputes were 
resolved, including a century old conflict between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle 
Channel Islands—a dispute which nearly led to military confrontation in 1978.  In fact, as 
a result of negotiations begun in 1990 after Chile’s return to democracy, all twenty four 
bilateral boundary and territorial disputes between the two nations were eventually 
settled.9  And the development of Argentine-Chilean cooperation was not an isolated 
phenomenon, but rather part of a broader trend.10  For instance, the 1990s also witnessed 
increased security cooperation and CBMs between Argentina and Brazil.  In 1990, both 
presidents signed an international agreement renouncing the development of nuclear 
weapons.  The agreement also paved the way for numerous institutional mechanisms to 
ensure joint compliance with the anti-nuclear accords eventually enacted.11  Cooperation 
in this area spilled over into other dimensions of interstate relations; as Sotomayor notes, 
“the treaties that eliminated a nuclear arms race in South America in the 1990s heralded a 
new atmosphere of international cooperation among two developing states.”12  Similarly, 
there was an upsurge in confidence-building measures in Central America as a product of 
the resolution of civil wars in the region.  This process was reinforced throughout the 
decade, as the region hosted an OAS conference on CBMs, and Central American 
militaries worked together in regional institutions. 
Although there have been significant advances in the Southern Cone and Central 
America, Andean nations have not realized similar progress on confidence-building 
measures.  As Bromley and Perdomo note, “existing agreements are not being 
implemented in an effective manner and opportunities to develop new mechanisms have 
not been pursued.”13  In particular, despite the predictions of democratic peace and 
                                                 
9 Domínguez, et al., “Boundary Disputes in Latin America,” United States Institute of Peace, 
Peacework, 31.  
10 Randall R. Parish, “Democrats, Dictators, and Cooperation: The Transformation of Argentine-
Chilean Relations,” Latin American Politics and Society 48 (Spring 2006): 167.  
11 Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez, “Civil-Military Affairs and Security Institutions in the Southern 
Cone: The Sources of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation,” Latin American Politics and Society 46 
(Winter 2004): 29-30.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Mark Bromley and Catalina Perdomo, “CBMS in Latin America and the Effect of Arms 
Acquisitions by Venezuela,” (working paper for the Real Instituto Elcano) (September 22, 2005): 4.  
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capitalist peace theories, Peru and Chile have experienced increasing areas of conflict 
even as democracy has deepened its roots and economic integration has developed.  For 
example, a maritime boundary border dispute that Chile considers long sense resolved 
has recently been submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by Peru for 
arbitration, while both countries continue to engage in military modernization programs 
that some fear is part of a larger regional arms race.  “Latin America remains a region 
where one country’s arms acquisitions can have a potentially destabilizing impact on 
regional security,” Bromley and Perdomo posit,14 while John Vazquez and Marie 
Henehan (quoted in Domínguez) argue that “territorial disputes increased the probability 
of war and have a higher probability of [leading states] to war than other kinds of 
disputes.”15   
Thus, potential for conflict between Chile and Peru remains high.  At the same 
time, both the failure to resolve long standing territorial issues and the inability to 
implement confidence building measures could adversely affect regional security and 
stability, even if a militarized interstate violence does not occur.  In short, it is important 
to examine and attempt to understand the likelihood of interstate tensions between Chile 
and Peru even if they do not result in an armed violence. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Several traditional theories have been advanced to understand the aforementioned 
unprecedented warming of relations demonstrated within the Southern Cone.  In 
particular, democratic peace and economic integration theories attributed the changes, 
respectively, to the transitions to democracy and free markets.  However, as I will soon 
illustrate, neither theory can fully account for, or especially guarantee, security 
cooperation in the region.   
                                                 
14 Bromley and Perdomo, “CBMS in Latin America and the Effect of Arms Acquisitions by 
Venezuela,” 5.  
15 Domínguez, et al., “Boundary Disputes in Latin America,” United States Institute of Peace, 
Peacework, 14.  
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Moreover, the literature suffers from selection bias: it has focused 
overwhelmingly on cases where increased cooperation has occurred (the Southern Cone 
and, to a lesser extent, Central America) but has failed to study regions, such as the 
Andes, which has notably lagged behind in the development of confidence building 
measures and resolution of border disputes, despite a shared experience of 
democratization and economic integration.  The war between Ecuador and Peru in 1995, 
as I detailed earlier, was in fact a war between two democracies.  Moreover, the recent 
troop posturing of Venezuela against Colombia, which I also addressed earlier, occurred 
despite large amounts of bi-lateral trade between the involved states.  Bilateral trade 
between Colombia and Venezuela, for example, was approximately four billion dollars in 
2006 and as much as five or six billion dollars in 2007.16  Such incidents, therefore, 
easily call into question the applicability of democratic peace or economic integration 
based approaches to peace.   
This thesis sets out to rectify these shortcomings.  It subsumes the insights of the 
democratic peace and economic integration literature into a more comprehensive political 
economy framework for understanding the preferences of key actors with regard to 
security cooperation and their ability to act on these preferences.  It then applies the 
framework to the current situation in Peru and Chile in order to understand the potential 
for, and likely implications of, interstate conflict between the two nations.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“The appeal of different schools of thought in international relations tends to vary 
with developments in the real world,” notes Richard Betts.  “Perhaps because the 
twentieth century was one of unprecedented catastrophe, the dominant tradition has been 
what is colloquially as ‘power politics.’”17  According to such thought, states are driven 
to seek power in an environment void of mechanisms to settle disputes or enforce 
judgments—this can, and does often lead to war.  As Betts summarizes succinctly, 
                                                 
16 Humberto Márquez, “Colombia-Venezuela: Possibly the Bitterest Conflict in a Century,” Inter 
Press Service News Agency, November 26, 2007. 
17 Richard Betts, ed., Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace (New 
York: Longman, 2007), 53. 
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“States have no one but themselves to rely on for protection, or to obtain what they 
believe they are entitled to by right.”18  Based on this theoretical approach, we would 
expect security concerns between Chile and Peru to dominate the bilateral agenda, 
especially since Chilean defense spending exceeds that of Peru.  For example, some 
authors argue that Chile is instigating a regional arms race.  COHA analyst Alex Sanchez 
posits that Chile’s recent arms procurements “have led to expressions of alarm in 
neighboring Argentina, Peru and Bolivia.”19  These concerns are real, and a central 
concern of the thesis is assessing the importance of the military balance of power and 
realist concerns in driving Peruvian-Chilean interstate relations. 
Interestingly, though, most of the recent literature on interstate relations in Latin 
America has largely eschewed a realist analysis and has focused instead on liberal 
institutionalist arguments, such as democratic peace theory and capitalist peace theory. 
This is strongly driven, as Betts notes, by developments in the real world:  scholarly 
interest in the dramatically improved interstate relations in Central America and Southern 
Cone has led to an emphasis on theories that account for this, while downplaying the 
importance of military balance of power.  In so doing, Latin American analysts have 
drawn on a growing set of liberal institutionalist arguments articulated in the broader 
international relations literature.  
Democratic peace theory, Sebastian Rosato argues, “is probably the most 
powerful liberal contribution to the debate on the causes of war and peace.20  Tracing its 
origins to the likes of Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace,” the argument provides simply 
that democracies never, or at least rarely, go to war with one another.  As Michael Doyle 
writes, “When the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments, wars 
                                                 
18 Betts, ed., Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, 54.  
19 “Chile’s Aggressive Military Arm Purchases are Ruffling the Region, Alarming in Particular 
Bolivia, Peru and Argentina,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs Webpage, 
http://www.coha.org/2007/08/chile%e2%80%99s-aggressive-military-arm-purchases-is-ruffling-the-
region-alarming-in-particular-bolivia-peru-and-argentina (accessed August 7, 2008).  
20 Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” The American Political 
Science Review 97 (November 2003): 585.  
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become impossible.”21  This argument does not maintain that democracies never go to 
war, but rather democracies have created a “separate peace.”  In other words, peaceful 
restraint only applies in a democratic state’s relations with another democracy,22 while 
“liberal republics see themselves as threatened by aggression from nonrepublics that are 
not constrained by representation.”23  Thomas Risse shares a similar view.  He argues 
that democracies do not fight each other “because they perceive each other as pre-
disposed toward peacefulness then act on this assumption.”24  They perceive each other 
as peaceful, he contends, because of the democratic norms which govern their decision 
making processes.  “These norms constitute their collective identity in international 
relations,” Risse continues.  “They externalize them when dealing with each other, thus 
reinforcing the presumption of peacefulness.”25 
Sebastian Rosato, however, is one of many to question the claims of democratic 
peace theory.  He concluded, “liberal democracies do not reliably externalize their 
domestic norms of conflict resolution and do not treat one another with trust and respect 
when their interests clash.”26  Moreover, he argues that democratic leaders “…are not 
especially accountable to peace loving publics…”27  Rosato goes on to posit that an 
“imperial peace” based on American power is one significant reason for peaceful 
relations.28  Thus, while there may be peace among some democratic nations, it may not 
entirely be due to democratic institutions.   
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder support the idea of a democratic peace for 
established democracies, but argue, however, that “the specter of war” looms large for 
                                                 
21 Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” The American Political Science Review 80 
(December 1986): 1151.  
22 Ibid., 1156.  
23 Ibid., 1162.  
24 Thomas Risse, “Democratic Peace-Warlike Democracies?: A Social Constructivist Interpretation of 
the Liberal Argument,” European Journal of International Relations 1 (1995): 36.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” 599.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. 
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democratizing states with weak democratic institutions.29  For instance, they cite the 
1995 conflict between Peru and Ecuador, two democracies, as a prime example.30  Under 
such conditions (of weak institutions), “elites commonly employ nationalist rhetoric to 
mobilize mass support but then become drawn into the belligerent foreign policies 
unleashed by this process.”31  
The problem with the widely-cited Mansfield and Snyder argument is that it 
cannot explain why some democratizing states with weak democratic institutions have 
not only not engaged in nationalist rhetoric and bellicose foreign policies but have moved 
to the opposite end of the spectrum, revolutionizing their foreign policies in a peaceful 
direction.  This is the case, for example, of Argentina and Chile in the 1980s and 1990s 
and Argentina and Brazil in the late 1980s, when century-old border disputes were 
resolved and tense rivalries were turned into fruitful partnerships.  Clearly, other 
variables are needed to understand the incentives facing political actors in democratizing 
states with weak institutions. 
In many Latin American cases, newly democratic but weak civilian governments 
concerned with political survival did not engage in nationalist rhetoric to mobilize 
support; instead, they tried to gain civilian control over the powerful militaries that 
threaten their political survival.  (This strategy had the added benefit of being politically 
popular in newly democratizing countries transiting away from abusive military regimes.)  
As Arturo Sotomayor argues, Argentina and Brazil in the late 1980s feared a credible 
threat of military regime change.  As a result, both executives sought to contain their 
unchecked militaries, prevent further insubordination and retain civilian control.32  To 
accomplish their goals, Sotomayor argues, the presidents entered into a strategic alliance.  
By recognizing each other as allies and not enemies, “the civilian leaders could reduce 
the possibility that the armed forces would use the external environment as a justification 
                                                 
29 Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War,” 
International Organization 56 (Spring 2002): 298.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid., 298.  
32 Sotomayor, “Civil-Military Affairs and Security Institutions in the Southern Cone: The Sources of 
Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation,” 43.  
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for their presence in the decision making process.”33  The executives relied on a strategy 
of “omnibalancing” which posits that in order to achieve certain goals, leaders must 
sometimes align themselves with adversaries.34  Thus, in Latin America—where military 
intervention in politics has been commonplace—the nature of civil-military relations is 
likely to be decisive in shaping executive preferences with respect to security 
cooperation.  
Another theory which has intended to explain peace and cooperation is based on 
economic integration among states.  The “capitalist peace” theory, as it has been dubbed, 
is not new.  It traces its origins to the likes of Montesquieu and Adam Smith.  However, 
in the contemporary age of globalization, economic integration peace theories have 
gained in momentum.  In the past, victory in war meant new property (and new resources, 
one can infer).  However, in a free market economy, “war destroys immense wealth for 
victor and loser alike.”35  Moreover, even if the capital stock is restored after war, 
efficient production would be difficult to coordinate to the victor’s advantage.  For 
example, it has been pointed out that Iraq’s immense oil wealth will never be a money 
maker for the United States.36  Patrick McDonald also advocates the merits of economic 
cooperation.  He argues:  “…trade makes war less likely by increasing the costs of 
severing …economic links.  Interdependence makes conflict less likely because of its 
efficiency over conquest in acquiring resources necessary for growth and prosperity.”37   
However, economic integration, like democracy, does not automatically lead to 
increased cooperation and decreased likelihood of conflict.38  Instead, the effects are 
mediated by the views and preferences of political actors.  Domínguez, for instance, 
argues that increased security cooperation and a decrease in the likelihood of conflict 
                                                 
33 Sotomayor, “Civil-Military Affairs and Security Institutions in the Southern Cone: The Sources of 
Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation,” 44.  
34 Ibid., 42. 
35 Erik Gartzke, “Future Depends on Capitalizing on Capitalist Peace,” Windsor Star, October 1, 2005.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Patrick J. McDonald, “Peace Through Trade or Free Trade?,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 
(August 2004): 547.  
38 Domínguez, et al., “Boundary Disputes in Latin America,” 34. 
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only occur where leaders have articulated a “grand strategy” in which interstate 
cooperation is linked to economic prosperity.  “Where development becomes the key 
concern of domestic elites”, Domínguez argues, “territorial and boundary dispute 
settlement is likely to follow as a by-product provided thinking about development is 
directly linked to thinking about peace.”39  However, “Where sovereignty, boundary, and 
territorial concerns are accorded higher priority than developmental objectives, conflict at 
the border will linger and perhaps worsen.”40  
Thus, the preferences of executive actors (and not merely the existence of 
democratic or capitalist institutions) are a fundamental factor shaping the likelihood of 
increased security cooperation between states.  This, however, says little about whether 
they will be able to act on their preferences.   
Randal Parish argues, for example, that bilateral cooperation is most effective 
“when executives have the capacity to implement their preferences.”41  Parish borrows 
from Mainwaring and Shugart in positing that constitutional power, partisan power and 
political capital all work to increase a president’s capacity to act.42  More importantly, 
though, Parish suggests the executive’s ability to act is also strongly influenced by his 
relationship with the legislature and political parties, as well as the military.43  Chile and 
Argentina, he contends, have been able to put past differences aside because of a pattern 
of strong executive leadership.  “Argentina’s post-1983 democracy, Pinochet’s 
dictatorship, and the post-1990 Chilean democracy each possessed strong presidencies,” 
he notes.44  Peru, however, represents “a different extreme on the institutional spectrum.”  
At the same time as Chile and Argentina were witnessing increased cooperation,  
 
 
                                                 
39 Domínguez, et al., “Boundary Disputes in Latin America.” 
40 Ibid.  
41 Parish, “Democrats, Dictators, and Cooperation: The Transformation of Argentine-Chilean 
Relations,” 148.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid., 168.  
44 Ibid., 154.  
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“constitutionally weak executives in the Andean nations were struggling unsuccessfully 
to sustain cooperative initiatives…”  As a result, Peru and Ecuador engaged “in the 
deadliest cross-border war in South America in a half-century.”45   
Thus, the executive will only be able to act on his preferences if they coincide 
with those of the military, or if civilians have control over the military.  Civil-military 
relations are important not only for shaping executive incentives to pursue security 
cooperation (as Sotomayor argues) but also as a factor affecting the executive’s ability to 
act on his or her preferences.  Likewise, the incentives which the legislatures face (both 
ruling and in opposition) are also, at times, a key aspect of the president’s ability to act.  
For this reason, the strengths and preferences of the executive, the military and 
legislatures are critical components of the political-economy framework I will use in my 
study. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis argues that the strengths and preferences of actors are key to 
understanding the dynamics of interstate relations.  These dynamics can include, for 
example, the employment (or lack thereof) of confidence building measures, the 
execution of joint military exercises, the development of security accords, the positioning 
(or de-positioning) of troops (and hardware) along the border, the acquisition of military 
hardware, as well as the ability (or inability) to solve lingering border disputes.   
I focus the analysis on the time period 1968 to the present.  Changes in regime 
type during this time period and growing economic integration allow for a test of the 
liberal peace and capitalist peace theories.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The second chapter of this thesis addresses Chile-Peru interstate relations from 
1968 to 1980.  Arguably, during this era, there existed limited periods of democracy and 
scant signs of economic integration.  As a result, I found the pattern of relations was best 
                                                 
45 Parish, “Democrats, Dictators, and Cooperation: The Transformation of Argentine-Chilean 
Relations,” 168.  
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defined by the realist’s notion of balance of power.  This was demonstrated by the 
acquisition of arms by both states, as well as each state’s desire to maintain its territorial 
integrity.  Nevertheless, competition during this period was tempered by two factors—a 
balance of identity and the use of confidence building measures.   
The third chapter addresses interstate relations from 1980 to 2000.  Overall, the 
two decades represented an era of peace and increased cooperation.  Peace and increased 
cooperation occurred, however, despite the existence of mutual democratic regimes. Peru 
democratized in 1980, while Chile remained a military dictatorship.  Conversely, when 
Chile democratized in 1990, Peru slipped under the authoritarianism of Alberto Fujimori.  
Nevertheless, the executives in each of the democratizing states possessed the necessary 
capacity to act on their political agendas.  In both Chile and Peru, this included 
subordinating the military regime while also restoring international legitimacy to their 
governments.  In so doing, the executives were able to reach across democratic 
boundaries and effect change in authoritarian regimes.   
The fourth chapter addresses Chile-Peru relations for the period 2001 to the 
present.  It is during this period that both governments, for the first time in my analysis, 
are democratic in nature.  Yet the traditional theories fail again here.  For despite the 
democratic nature of both regimes, and explicit overtures of peace emanating from the 
executives, interstate relations have become increasingly tense.  This is best explained by 
the nature of the Peruvian politics.  Peruvian politicians, for example, seek to increase 
their authority by inciting nationalist grievances.  As a result, the executives have been 
constrained in their ability to act on their good intentions.  This has led to a renewed 
border dispute between Chile and Peru. 
The concluding chapter provides an overview of my argument and a brief outlook 
for the future of Chile-Peru relations. 
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II. INTERSTATE RELATIONS, 1968-1980 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter consists of three principal sections.  In the first section, I describe the 
historical relations, which have developed, between Chile and Peru since before 
independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century.  For the most part, the Chile-
Peru wars of the nineteenth century were fought for the control of natural resources.  
Their outcomes, however, helped to develop the formation of strong and lasting national 
identities.  The resultant strong nationalistic sentiment generated by early conflict still 
drives foreign policy decisions today.  Thus, a sound understanding of early bilateral 
relations is necessary to understand better my analysis of more recent developments.   
The second section of this chapter looks at the developments in foreign relations 
between the period 1968 and 1980.  This period spans the military government of Peru, 
which began in 1968, and leads to the eve of its return to democracy in 1980.  This same 
time period also covers Chile’s experiment with democratic socialism from 1970-1973, 
the oppressive military coup of 1973, and the consolidation of the dictatorship of General 
Augusto Pinochet from 1973 to 1980. 
In looking at the development of international relations, I focus on three distinct 
aspects, which consistently emerge over time.  For instance, I highlight the implications 
of military hardware purchases, as well as the mobilization and placement of troops.  I 
find the emergence of an arms race beginning in the early 1970s under the reins of 
Chile’s Marxist president Salvador Allende and Peru’s left-leaning military dictator, 
General Juan Velasco.  The acquisition of sophisticated weaponry continues on both 
sides throughout the decade, however, despite the right-wing shifts of power via General 
Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1973 and General Francisco Morales in Peru in 1975.   
I also address the inability of the two states to resolve lingering border and 
maritime disputes, which led to increased tensions along the tri-border region of Chile, 
Peru and Bolivia beginning mid-decade.  The Treaty of Lima mandated Peru’s 
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involvement in Bolivian negotiations with Chile for sea access.  The inability of the three 
states to find compromise in negotiations in 1976 nearly led to cross border aggression.  
By 1978, Chile had severed formal relations with both Bolivia and Peru.  The arms race 
and inability to solve lingering border disputes occurred despite the implementation of 
confidence building measures (CBMs), which are intended “to reduce the risk of conflict 
by making capabilities obvious, by signaling intentions, and by moving back down the 
mutually reinforcing spiral of mistrust, secrecy, and tension.”46   
The third section of this chapter provides an explanation for this pattern of 
interstate relations.  Indeed, economic and democratic peace theories, as introduced in my 
introductory chapter, fall short in their ability to mitigate the potential for conflict during 
this era.  Arguably, these theories are irrelevant, since there was little democracy and 
little economic integration during this time period.  Not surprisingly, realist balance of 
power concerns seem to drive the relationship during this time period.  The balance of 
power relationship, for instance, is manifest through the “tit-for-tat” acquisition of arms 
conducted by both regimes throughout the decade in order to achieve military supremacy.  
Moreover, Chile’s resolve to maintain its territorial integrity and its inability to resolve 
border disputes with its neighbors, demonstrate the importance of “power politics” during 
this era.   
Interestingly, competition was kept in check by two key factors.  First, although 
realist actors engaged in a clear-eyed pursuit of arms to balance one another throughout 
the time period, the expression of the rivalry in other realms (and hence the likelihood of 
conflict) was tempered by identity politics.  Barletta and Trinkunas refer to this as the 
“Balance of Identity.”  According to this theory, “[the] struggle for security centers not 
on the relative distribution of military capabilities among states, but on the distribution of 
political actors’ identities with respect to their control over states.”47  In 1970, for 
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example, Peru expressed hope for an “ideological peace” with the Marxist Allende 
regime.  Peru’s Velasco, while very nationalist, continued to arm, but toned down his 
rhetoric under Allende.  His rhetoric seemed to increase, however, with Pinochet in 
power.  Moreover, between 1978 and 1980, Peru and Chile cooperated, although 
covertly, in the right-wing Operation Condor.   
Second, realist actors engaged in confidence-building measures throughout the 
decade.  The most significant measure, the 1976 “Agreement on Cooperation for 
Strengthening Peace and Friendship,” was an explicit recognition by the military 
governments involved that while as realists they would stubbornly defense their national 
interests in trilateral negotiations, they also understood the need to keep the resulting 
tensions from flaring up. CBMs were neither simple “window dressing” employed by 
realist actors to quiet the international community, nor were they the first steps down a 
neoliberal institutionalist path of increased trust and resolution of differences.   
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE   
The relationship between Chile and Peru has been complicated by centuries of 
animosity and conflict.  In order to understand the dynamic relationship that exists today, 
it is necessary to address the wars that began the conflict and the issues left unresolved by 
subsequent treaties.   
1. Nineteenth Century Warfare 
Chile’s problematic relationship with Peru pre-dates the end of the colonial 
period, a time in which Chile was administered as a sub-region of the Viceroyalty of 
Peru.  Because a mercantilist Spain controlled the flow of goods both into and from the 
region via a fixed trade route, ships carrying goods from Spain sailed directly to Peru.  
Only after arriving in Lima did local Peruvian merchants select specific goods destined 
for the Chilean market. While such an arrangement benefited the Spanish crown (as well 
as the Peruvians), it proved less beneficial to both Chilean consumers and producers.48 
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Regional animosities intensified following mutual struggles of independence.  In 
October 1836, the Confederation of Peru-Bolivia was established.  Thus, in effect, Chile 
confronted a combined military and economic powerhouse to its north.49  While most 
Chileans felt no need to engage in armed conflict, some government officials argued for a 
war for trade supremacy in the Pacific.50  A failed Peru-led attempt to overthrow the 
conservative Chilean regime provided sufficient “casus belli” for Chilean officials who 
immediately dispatched navy warships.51  The Chilean government, however, first tried 
diplomacy to defuse the situation, sending an envoy to Lima to demand the immediate 
dissolution of the Confederation.  The proposal was ultimately rejected, and Chile’s 
frustrated envoy summed up the situation as follows:  “The Confederation must disappear 
forever…We must dominate forever in the Pacific.”52  Chile subsequently declared war 
on the Confederation and claimed victory with the destruction of Confederation forces at 
the Battle of Yungay in January 1839.  Following its defeat, the Confederation quickly 
dissolved53 but the basis for mutual distrust between Chileans and Peruvians remained.   
Four decades later, Peru and Chile were again embroiled in war.  In the early 
years of independence, neither country had contested its mutual border in the Atacama 
Desert.  Nevertheless, when nitrate deposits were discovered there, the region quickly 
became a focal point for conflicting territorial claims.54  Peru claimed a strip of desert 
235 miles long, while Bolivia claimed the next 240 miles south to the twenty-fifth 
parallel.  Chile, however, claimed overlapping territory northward as far as the twenty-
third parallel.  All three countries accurately viewed the desert’s resources as a potential 
source of important revenue in a period of financial hardship.55   
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In 1866, the Bolivians proposed, and the Chileans accepted, an agreement to 
establish their mutual border at the twenty-fifth parallel.  However, the agreement proved 
only temporary.  Bolivia soon discovered an anti-Chilean “soul mate” in Peru.  In 
February 1873 the two governments signed a secret military agreement pledging to come 
to each other’s aid should Chile threaten either signatory.56  In 1878, Bolivian General 
Hilarión Daza overthrew the Bolivian government.  He rejected the established border 
accord with Chile and promptly raised taxes on nitrate exports.57  Daza was confident of 
his actions and fully expected the Chileans to capitulate.  Moreover, if the Chileans 
resisted, Daza believed he could invoke the “secret” 1873 treaty with Peru.  Chilean 
President Aníbal Pinto did not capitulate and ordered the Chilean army to seize 
Antofagasta as well as territory ceded to Bolivia under an earlier accord.  Two weeks 
after Chilean forces occupied Antofagasta, Bolivia declared war.58 
Indeed, the Chileans had long known about the “secret” Peruvian-Bolivian 
alliance.  President Pinto, however, maintained hope that Peru could be persuaded to 
avoid conflict.59  In one instance, Peruvian president Manuel Prado even offered to 
mediate the conflict between Chile and Bolivia.  However, at the same time, Peru showed 
clear signs of readying their armed forces.  President Pinto offered Peru economic 
concessions in return for neutrality, but to no avail.  Pressed to answer whether it planned 
to honor its treaty with Bolivia, Peru responded in the affirmative.  Diplomacy failed 
again, and as a result, Chile declared war on both Bolivia and Peru in April 1879.60  Peru 
capitulated in October 1883, and as mandated by the Treaty of Ancón, ceded the territory 
of Tarapacá and agreed that Chile would govern Tacna and Arica for ten years—until a 
plebiscite would determine the sovereignty of the provinces.61   
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By the end of the war, Peru lay in ruins.  Economic production and income levels 
there had fallen significantly, the death toll was substantial, and destruction of the 
infrastructure was extensive.62  For Chile, however, the situation was quite different.  
Chile’s victory gave the country new territory whose rich store of resources would 
provide a constant source of revenue.63  Indeed, as William Sater astutely surmises, 
“[The War of the Pacific] would dramatically alter not merely these nations’ boundaries 
but their collective memory as well.”64 
2. Early Twentieth Century Settlement 
The Treaty of Ancón mandated that Chile govern the occupied Peruvian 
provinces of Tacna and Arica for ten years until a plebiscite would determine their 
sovereignty.  It was not until 1925—more than forty years later, however, that 
discussions between Chile and Peru finally materialized.  “When an agreement between 
the two nations to hold a plebiscite in the disputed provinces…was announced,” Klarén 
notes, “such was the nationalist reaction [in Peru] that it provoked a general strike, a 
student riot, and a mob attack on the U.S. Embassy in protest against American mediation 
of the dispute.”65  As a result of the violence, the plebiscite was indefinitely postponed.  
A chance meeting between diplomats in 1929, however, resulted in an unexpected final 
agreement known as the Treaty of Lima.  Under its provisions, Chile and Peru divided 
the disputed provinces.  Tacna was returned to Peru, while Arica was formally integrated 
into Chile.  In addition, Chile paid Peru $6 million and provided port facilities for Peru in 
the Bay of Arica.66   
By 1932, a new land border had been successfully delineated to the satisfaction of 
both sides in the conflict.67  Nevertheless, Chile’s resolution of border issues with Bolivia 
                                                 
62 Klarén, Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes, 191. 
63 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-2002, 146. 
64 Sater, Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884, 1. 
65 Klarén, Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes, 258-259. 
66 Ibid., 259. 
67 Collier and Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-2002, 217. 
 19
remained complicated.  As mandated in the 1929 treaty, neither Chile nor Peru “could 
cede to a third state any of the territories over which they were granted sovereignty in the 
treaty without the prior agreement of the other signatory.”68  Thus, when in August 1975 
the Bolivian government requested a sovereign land corridor to the sea, Peru’s attention 
became necessary.  Tripartite discussions ultimately failed, heightening the potential for 
conflict among the three states. 
The resolution of a maritime border between Chile and Peru has also recently 
become complicated.  In the 1950s, both Peru and Chile adopted several fishing accords, 
which Chilean officials claimed formally established its maritime boundary with Peru.  
The government of Peru, however, presently maintains that the 1950s agreements were 
not treaties as such, but simply “accords on fishing rights”69 and that it has never 
officially recognized those established limits.  In 2005, the Peruvian government 
unexpectedly published an official map claiming the expanded “fishing-rich” waters.  It 
subsequently filed a claim in the International Court of Justice in 2008.70  
In sum, the Chile-Peru wars of the nineteenth century were fought largely over 
natural resources.  Yet their outcomes shaped the formation of strong and lasting national 
identities.  The four-decade long delay in crafting the Treaty of Lima, and the pervasive 
land and maritime disputes, are evidence of the difficult intricacies of interstate relations 
between these two states.  Indeed, such difficulties and others are manifest in more 
contemporary relations. 
C. A REALIST TAKE ON INTERSTATE RELATIONS:  1968-1980 
Throughout the twelve-year period addressed in this chapter, several strong 
themes of bilateral international relations between Chile and Peru developed.  
Specifically, despite instances of cooperation and confidence building, military and 
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diplomatic tensions prevailed.  For instance, my research illustrates an arms race 
conducted by both Chile and Peru in the 1970s despite the adoption of several significant 
peace accords designed to limit arms spending.  The 1974 “Treaty of Ayacucho,” 
proposed by Peru and signed by Chile (among other parties) attempted to set limits of 
arms purchases.  Yet Peru’s acquisition of arms, begun under General Velasco’s tenure in 
1968 continued into the Morales regime beginning in 1975.   
Moreover, land and maritime demarcation also remained a pervasive bilateral 
controversy throughout this period of study.  Despite the implementation of formal 
treaties and accords, for instance, border tensions between Chile and Peru nearly led to 
armed conflict in the late 1970s.  The 1976 “Agreement on Cooperation for 
Strengthening Peace and Friendship,” signed by the governments of Chile, Peru and 
Bolivia, had attempted to establish a mechanism whereby states could peacefully solve 
disputes.  By 1978, however, the government of Peru broke relations with Chile in 
response to a spy scandal.  Moreover, the centennial anniversary of the War of the Pacific 
in 1979 brought with it on both sides fears of nationalist reprisals.  By the end of the 
decade, despite a decline in the arms race, both Chile and Peru had mobilized troops 
along the border in a show of saber rattling.  The following pages expand on these and 
other developments of Peru-Chile relations. 
1. Reformist Relations, 1968-1973 
Since his election in 1964, the Eduardo Frei administration in Chile had espoused 
an independent foreign policy stance.  According to Hudson, the administration “was 
more collegial with the developing nations and less hostile to the Communist bloc 
nations” than the preceding rightist administration of Jorge Alessandri had been.71  Frei 
restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and most of its allies.  Moreover, 
during his administration, Chile also gave strong backing to multilateral organizations, 
such as the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Andean Group, the 
Organization of American States (OAS), and the United Nations.   
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At the same time, however, relations between Chile and its neighbors often 
proved tense.  For instance, Wilhelmy argues that the Beagle Channel Islands dispute 
with Argentina “was of crucial importance for Chile’s international position” between 
1967 and 1970.  At the time, the military dictatorship in Argentina possessed both a 
military and economic advantage in the region and would thus be able “to retaliate more 
effectively than Chile in case of difficulties on the border.”  Thus, for the Frei 
government, the settlement of the Beagle dispute was indeed a defensive goal.  Wilhelmy 
argues that Chilean foreign policy in the final years of the Frei administration “was 
directed to put maximum pressure on Argentina to reach an agreement on the terms of a 
judicial settlement.”  In late 1967, tensions were augmented when Chilean patrol boats 
engaged in “unauthorized maneuvers” deemed “provocative” by Argentine forces.  
Nevertheless, by 1970, Chile’s position with respect to Argentina had improved 
considerably, as “a sort of tacit agreement on [future rules of] arbitration was reached” by 
both governments.72  
In 1968, the Peruvian military seized control of the government for the second 
time in six years.73  The administration, headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, was 
leftist in its approach and strongly “committed to a thorough structural transformation of 
the country.”74  With the “peaceful” overthrow of the first Belaúnde administration in 
October 1968, “a new era of national self-assertion, sovereignty, and independence began 
to shape Peruvian foreign policy.”75  Almost immediately, the Revolutionary 
Government headed by General Juan Velasco began to expand its commercial and 
diplomatic relations throughout the world.  For instance, Velasco’s regime became 
radically involved in neutrality movements such as the Organization of Non-Aligned 
Countries and the Group of 77.  Moreover, Peru’s military regime began to disregard the 
traditional “East-West” rivalries, and by early 1969, had established both diplomatic and 
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commercial relations with the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China and Cuba. 76  
This cooperation, Bruce St. John notes, also enabled Peru’s military to broaden its policy 
of arms transfer diversification with the Soviet Union.77  As a result, the acquisition of 
weapons from the U.S.S.R. soon “ranked Peru second only to Cuba…in the 
hemisphere.”78 
The military coup in Peru in 1968 was received “with great concern” within 
government circles in Chile.  Wilhelmy notes: 
Although relations with [Peru’s] Belaúnde government had never been 
particularly close, its fall seemed to prejudice Chilean interests.  The 
dispute with Argentina continued unresolved in late 1968, as did the 
Bolivian problem [which centered on unresolved border issues dating to 
the War of the Pacific].  There was a certain feeling of “encirclement” 
among Chilean officials as [their] only civilian-ruled neighbor became a 
military dictatorship.79  
Soon, however, officials in Chile realized the new Velasco administration was not a 
“traditional” conservative military government.  Wilhelmy notes, rather, that is was in 
fact nationalistic, populist, and anti-capitalist in nature.80  Indeed, by 1970, Chilean 
efforts were underway to develop a common Latin American position with regards to 
maritime boundaries.  “This time,” Wilhelmy notes, “Peru was to be Chile’s main 
partner.”81   
In Chile, Marxist Salvador Allende’s election to the Chilean presidency in 1970 
fueled an already developing discontent within the conservative Chilean military and the 
civilian elites.82  Thus, with respect to the foreign policy decisions enacted under the 
Allende regime, the executive’s “inclinations and interests” were grounded 
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overwhelmingly on dealing with Chile’s internal situations.  Chile’s foreign relations, 
Wilhelmy notes, were thus considered a second-level concern.  “Although [foreign 
policy] was not to be neglected,” he contends, “it had to follow the priorities and 
demands of the internal situation.”83   
Given the socialist nature of the regime, the foreign policy agenda, which did 
emerge, not surprisingly, was “increasingly independent of the United States yet 
increasingly dependent on other nations and international agencies as sources of credit 
and assistance.”84  For example, under Allende’s Popular Unity government, relations 
with socialist countries increased.  By 1972, Chile had established formal relations with 
the People’s Republic of China, East Germany, North Korea and North Vietnam.  
Moreover, under this administration, Chile reestablished full relations with Cuba, which 
had been broken since 1964.85  Despite the fact that the Soviet Union had become more 
influential during the Allende administration, however, it “was reluctant to commit…on a 
large scale to underwrite the Chilean Socialist regime.”86  Thus, when Chile elected 
Marxist Salvador Allende to the presidency in 1970, the Peruvian government responded 
with a cautious optimism.  A primary reason for their caution was the concern that 
Allende would spur an arms race through the purchase of modern arms in an attempt to 
pacify Chile’s right-wing military leaders.87  
Peruvian fears of Chilean arms acquisitions did, in fact, come to fruition.  At the 
same time traditional U.S. influence to the Chilean government was waning (in response 
to Allende’s Marxist policies), U.S. military aid to the Chile’s armed forces increased 
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threefold.88  (In fact, military assistance was the only type of U.S. aid furnished during 
the Allende administration). Retention of strong ties with the U.S. military establishment, 
North suggests, was a policy invoked by Allende’s strategists “in order to satisfy the 
institutional demands of the armed forces” and uphold the government.  In essence, 
Allende saw the need to advance the prerogatives of the military in order to quell dissent 
and maintain internal stability.   
As a result of government policy and continued U.S. aid, military spending under 
Allende increased to cover salary increases across the board, as well as to fund military 
housing construction, and more importantly, the acquisition of new military hardware.  
Between 1970 and 1973, Chile ordered or took delivery of some 60 M-41 Walker 
Bulldog Tanks from the United States.  The acquisition also included various types of 
aircraft and Navy vessels.  Moreover, during this time period, Chile’s military received 
fifteen Hunter Fighter Ground Attack aircraft from the United Kingdom.89  As can be 
anticipated, “this policy of building up the armed forces,” North notes, “involved serious 
risks, since increased strength could be used to destroy the…government as well as 
uphold it.”90  Increased strength also ran the danger of escalating tensions with a 
historically suspicious neighbor, Peru.   
However, Peru’s arms stockpiles also increased during this period.  The military’s 
increased acquisition of Soviet arms during this era was a direct result of what Foreign 
Minister General Miguel Angel de la Flor has called “U.S. hostility to Peru’s 
rearmament.”  Saba suggests the U.S. encouraged Chile’s arms build-up during this 
period through continued financial assistance.  For instance, Chile received some $18M 
in U.S. military assistance between 1971 and 1972 compared with Peru’s $1.5M for the  
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same period.91  Nevertheless, despite the imbalance, SIPRI trade register data suggests 
the Peruvian military continued to receive more hardware from the United States during 
this period than from the Soviets.92 
2. Militaries in Power: Interstate Relations, 1973-1980 
Despite the bilateral increase in military hardware, any Peruvian hope for an 
ideological peace with Allende’s Marxist Chile was dashed in September 1973.  The 
violent military coup in Chile, which brought to power Augusto Pinochet “destroyed a 
blossoming Havana-Lima-Santiago axis,” leaving the government of Peru ideologically 
isolated.93  To add fuel to the potential fire, Chile’s rightist government began to spurn 
fears of a Peruvian invasion, as well as a conquest of former Peruvian territory.  In 
response, and as soon as late 1973, Peru’s military had staged a large portion of its forces 
in the southern region, near its border with Chile, as part of a “conscientization” 
program—a program aimed to instill a strong sense of nationalism among all Peruvians 
against its traditional enemy.94   
The Pinochet regime’s foreign policy was dynamic and reflected the strength and 
preferences of the military regime.  In the first years of the military regime internal 
consolidation was the number one priority of the Pinochet government.  As Muñoz notes, 
foreign policy became a secondary consideration to the administration.95  Moreover, 
whereas Chilean diplomacy since the 1950s had supported the precepts of democracy and 
international law, the new ruling junta did not.  Muñoz argues “…the military forces 
imprinted on Chilean foreign policy their own technical experience and anti-Communist 
world view…[which] allow[ed] little room for negotiating and compromising.”96   
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Despite occupying a secondary status, the anti-Communist fervor of Chile’s 
foreign policy was evidenced almost immediately.  One of the first foreign policy 
decisions of the regime, for instance, was to—once again—sever relations with Cuba.  As 
a result, numerous Communist or socialist nations throughout the world retaliated in-kind 
against the Pinochet government.  By 1974, the USSR, North Korea, North Vietnam and 
much of Eastern Europe had broken diplomatic ties with Chile.  In addition, Chile 
reestablished ties with South Vietnam later that year.97 
In the first few years immediately following the coup, Chile’s relations with the 
United States “were quite warm.”  However, the repressive brutality of the Pinochet 
military machine soon led to increasing political isolation of the Chilean government.  
“Governments of various ideological postures, ranging from Zambia to Belgium,” Muñoz 
posits, “quickly suspended their relations with the Chilean regime or lowered their 
representations in Santiago.”  Within the region, Mexico, too, severed relations with 
Chile in 1974, at the same time tensions were heating up with Colombia because the 
Chilean Foreign Minister had accused the Colombian ambassador of having close contact 
with “Communists and extremists.”98 
During Peru’s military government, first headed by General Velasco, the 
designation of the high command, as well as the promotions of high-level government 
positions were dictated by the armed forces “with absolute autonomy.”  Moreover, as 
Obando notes, the armed forces determined how the national defense system was 
organized and “decided who the enemies of the country were.”99  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the two war scenarios, which were developed by the decision makers, 
centered on historical “enemies” Chile and Ecuador.  Nevertheless, Obando posits, the 
threats were real and not just excuses for the arms acquisitions, which began to flourish 
under the Velasco regime. 
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Thus, it was no surprise when, by 1975, the U.S. media began to report on the 
emerging arms race between Chile and Peru, in development since the first years of the 
decade.  During this time, reports show Chile sought to purchase 40 French tanks to 
counter Peru’s purchase of hardware from the Soviets.100  The SIPRI database confirms 
the Peruvian purchases of 250 Russian built T-55 tanks between 1974 and 1975, yet 
shows no record of French tanks to Chile.101  However, despite U.S. congressional curbs 
on military sales to the region, both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. remained large suppliers of 
military arms throughout the period of analysis.  Indeed, the SIPRI database shows U.S. 
deliveries of M-113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers to both Chile and Peru between 1974 
and 1975.102  As an example of increasing tensions, Peruvian President Velasco 
announced in 1974 “We are not going to wait around with our hands in our pockets while 
our neighbors make their purchases of equipment.”103 
The arms race of the mid-1970s spread also to the acquisition of advanced fighter 
aircraft.  Though Chilean officials claimed the bulk of their military forces were stationed 
near Santiago to provide internal security, they were also leery of their northern neighbor.  
In the event of a Peruvian land invasion, Chilean officials claimed they would be grossly 
overmatched by Peruvian armor.  According to foreign observers, the Chileans had no 
tactical arsenal to defend themselves.104  Thus, Chile sought to purchase F-5E freedom 
fighters from the U.S. to counter a potential threat.  Indeed, U.S. State Department 
personnel remarked that Chile was the only major country in Latin America without 
supersonic combat aircraft.105  Between 1975 and 1977, Chile took delivery of 34 A-37 
ground attack Dragonflies and 18 F-5E Tiger-2 fighter aircraft.  During the same 
timeframe, however, Peru also assumed delivery of 36 A-37Bs from the United States.106     
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According to news reports, in 1974 alone, Peru dedicated nearly 14 percent of its 
national budget to acquiring arms, while Chile spent 11 percent.  Both instances 
represented roughly three percent of GNP.107  The report also noted that, since 1970, both 
nations had expanded the size of their armed forces.  Peru increased its total from 60,000 
to 65,000 personnel, while Chile’s forces surged from 64,000 to 75,000.108  To add fuel 
to the fire, the report also noted resurgent individual animosity.  Peruvian military 
academy graduates continued to be taught “revenge against Chile,” while General 
Velasco told friends he wished to recover Peru’s lost territory before he died.109 
Interestingly, one of the first military confidence building measures between 
Chile and Peru was put in place during this period.  Sponsored by Peru and signed in 
December 1974, the “Ayacucho Declaration” is considered by many to be one of the core 
multilateral instruments available for fostering confidence in the region.  In order to 
“dedicate all possible resources to economic development,” representatives from 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela jointly 
declared the need to “create conditions which permit effective limitation of armaments 
and put an end to their acquisition for offensive military purposes.”110  Isaac Caro notes 
that between 1975 and 1976, five meetings were held.  The first meeting resulted in the 
recommendation that the signatories encourage “measures designed to create a climate of 
confidence and mutual respect among the public; foster cooperation among military 
institutions; and exchange information on [military] topics,” while the second established 
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continues, “the experts called for the armed forces of Bolivia, Chile and Peru to cooperate 
in strengthening the peace through the establishment of procedures for consultations and 
annual meetings.”112   
Indeed, the commitment to limit arms was tested throughout the decade.  Military 
sources stressed that agreements such as the Ayacucho Declaration had “been made in 
the past and forgotten.”  Moreover, they stressed the signatories “merely agreed not to 
purchase ‘offensive weapons of a sophisticated nature.’”113  However, when asked about 
the apparent discrepancy between the increase in arms purchases and the Ayacucho 
negotiations, U.S. officials in 1975 insisted the signatories had made progress: “Since the 
Ayacucho meeting, representatives of Chile and Peru had met every month to discuss 
easing tensions along their 106 mile border.”114 
The skeptics proved correct.  Less than a year after the signing of the Declaration, 
Peru’s government revealed a plan to purchase “36 sophisticated Soviet jet fighter-
bombers” to match the fighter aircraft recently acquired [French Mirage 50 and U.S. F-
5E aircraft received between 1975-76] by Chile and Ecuador.115  As one journalist noted 
at the time, “Not only has the Chilean purchase of U.S. fighters caused alarm in Lima, but 
also Ecuador’s recent purchase of 12 British Jaguar fighters suggested to some Peruvians 
that Chile and Ecuador were trying to hem in Peru.”116  The Peruvian decision to 
purchase the aircraft from the Soviets came after the Pentagon delayed in approving the 
Peruvian Air Force’s request to purchase a number of F-5 fighter aircraft from the United 
States.  These aircraft represented the first sale of Soviet Combat aircraft to the continent, 
and stirred additional regional concern with the prospect of drawing Cuban military 
personnel to Peru as trainers.    
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Analysts suggested that Peru, despite fewer combat troops, would maintain a 
significant military edge over Chile.  After all, in 1974, the U.S. Congress initiated an 
arms ban directed against the Chilean government in response to its violation of human 
rights.117  The capstone to the embargo was the Carter administration’s PD-13 of 1977, 
which applied to all of Latin America and “required that all arms transfers be directly 
linked to United States security interests and tied them closely to the human rights record 
of recipient governments.”118  In addition, PD-13 prohibited the United States from 
selling weapons that were more sophisticated than those already in the region.  Thus, as 
Laurence McCabe notes, “Carter’s PD-13 essentially cut off all significant [U.S.] arms 
sales to the region.119   
The F-5s and A-37s, which Chile acquired before the ban, were no match for 
Peru’s anticipated Su-22s.  While American made F-4 Phantoms would have been able to 
counter the Su-22s, they were prohibited under the newly enacted U.S. embargo.120  In 
addition to superior aircraft, Chileans commanders longed for better tanks and an 
increased number of antiaircraft guns.  Collier and Sater suggest, however, that the U.S. 
ban “did not seriously inconvenience the regime.”  Brazil, for example, “was more than 
prepared to supply arms to Chile.”  Chile’s domestic arms industry was also beginning to 
boom at this time.121  During the embargo, the Chilean military was also able to purchase 
some equipment from private arms traders.  However, the weapons acquired by these 
means were largely unsophisticated and expensive in nature.  One Chilean analyst 
summed up the situation:  “Chile gets less for more.”122 
In Peru, a protracted illness led to General Velasco’s subsequent replacement in 
August 1975.  However, his successor—General Francisco Morales—insisted that Peru’s 
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governmental policy would remain the same.  Nevertheless, Morales soon began to turn 
away from the radical non-aligned movement of his predecessor as he reemphasized 
Peru’s commitment to regional diplomatic ties.  With that, St John notes, Peru’s 
relationship with the United States gradually began to improve, but its relationship with 
Chile became continued to be strained.  For example, the matter of Peru’s national 
defense became increasingly important to the Morales regime.  In line with Morales’ plan 
“to shift military policy back to the traditional emphasis on military preparedness and 
national sovereignty,” the government took an ever-increasing “hard-line” position 
towards its traditional enemies.123  This is best evidenced through Peru’s involvement in 
sea access negotiations between the governments of Chile and Bolivia.   
In late 1975, Bolivia’s President Hugo Banzer requested, “a sovereign coastline at 
Arica together with a land corridor 50 km long by 15 km wide further south.”  However, 
because of treaty stipulations, Peru’s attention to the negotiations became necessary.  
Chile responded to Bolivian officials with a counterproposal in December 1975, in which 
it offered a land-sea corridor along the border with Peru in exchange for “equivalent 
territorial compensation in the Bolivian altiplano.”  Though the Bolivian government 
initially favored such an agreement, it later rejected the Chilean proposal “arguing that it 
should not have to make territorial concessions to obtain land seized in an aggressive 
war.”124 
Having learned through “formal consultations” that the Bolivia-Chile talks 
concerned historically Peruvian territory, the Peruvian government, under President 
Morales, in 1976 prepared a counterproposal, which “effectively undercut the Chilean 
initiative.”  Peru, instead, proposed the creation of a zone of joint Bolivia-Chile-Peru 
sovereignty.  Though the counterproposal provided Bolivia with as much territory as 
Chile’s, St John argues it “also reintroduced the issue of Peruvian rights in the disputed 
zone.”  The Chilean government immediately rejected the proposal claiming it introduced 
“issues unrelated to the question at hand.”  The year ended with both Chile and Peru 
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blaming one another for the stalemate in negotiations.125  Moreover, in mid-1976, the 
Morales regime had used the conflict to conjure up a war scare with Chile in order to 
deflect attention away from Peru’s increasing internal political and economic woes.126   
During the same period, Peru’s relations were also worsening with Ecuador.  For 
instance, in 1976 Ecuadoran diplomats demanded of Peru a renegotiation of the Rio 
Protocol of 1942, which ended a state of war between the two countries in 1941.  Later 
that same year, an Ecuadoran newspaper also fueled regional tensions by reporting 
Morales’ alleged preparations for a military offensive into northern Chile.  General 
Morales initiated limited attempts at a peace initiative in 1977, but Ecuador’s subsequent 
plan to acquire advance jet-fighters ended any peace overtures.  Indeed, by January 1978 
the militaries of Peru and Ecuador were once again engaged in armed clashes along their 
shared Amazon border.127   
These tensions, both real and perceived, occurred despite earlier accords designed 
to limit such conflict.  For instance, the governments of Chile, Peru and Bolivia had 
signed the 1976 Agreement on Cooperation for Strengthening Peace and Friendship, 
which expressed “the sovereign equality of states, the abstention from the threat or use of 
force, the territorial inviolability of States, non-intervention in internal affairs, peaceful 
resolution of disputes, [as well as] cooperation among states.”  The agreement also 
proposed “consultative meetings” between representatives of the Armed Forces and the 
exchange of information.128  Moreover, as early as July 1975, the government of Peru 
expelled the Associated Press Bureau Chief on the grounds that she deliberately tried to 
damage “relations of friendship between Peru and Chile.”129  Such initiative captured the 
resolve of the Peruvian administration to deflate the increased tensions reported by the 
media.  Finally, in 1977, the foreign ministries of Chile, Peru and Ecuador displayed an 
unusual degree of solidarity with respect to maritime boundaries.  The 1952 tripartite 
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“Declaration of Santiago” had established sovereignty and jurisdiction 200 nautical miles 
from shore.  Yet throughout the decade, the United States often contested these limits.  
Thus, in August 1977, the foreign ministers of Ecuador, Peru and Chile gathered in 
Santiago to commemorate their successes during the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
treaty’s signing.130 
By late 1978, however, in anticipation of the War of the Pacific centennial, both 
Bolivia and Peru began a series of troop mobilizations against their borders with Chile.  
At the same time, Chile and Argentina, still involved in a lingering border dispute 
concerning the Beagle Channel Islands, “carried out extensive troop movements near 
their joint frontier.”131  The Beagle Channel Islands crisis with Argentina had flared 
again in 1978, when the government of Argentina rejected the outcome of the 1971 
mediation by Queen Elizabeth II.  For several weeks, tensions between Santiago and 
Buenos Aires reached a point “where the prospect of war seemed real.”  Papal mediation 
succeeded, however, and tensions eventually receded short of armed conflict.132  While 
most observers agreed Chile could have defended itself against any one of its neighbors, 
“the nightmare in Santiago [was] that all three…could attack at once in a coordinated 
military campaign” and Chile would have been forced to defend itself on three fronts 
thousands of miles apart.133   
Tensions between Chile and Peru further deteriorated that year with the discovery 
of a Chilean spy network directed towards Peru’s military installations. Peru expelled 
Chile’s ambassador and executed one of its airmen for allegedly passing secrets to the 
Chileans.  Military sources contended that the executed Peruvian airman had sold plans 
for a southern air base, as well as photos of Peruvian aircraft and facilities.134  Ultimately, 
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this led to the formal severance of diplomatic relations between the two states by the end 
of 1978.135  Moreover, in 1978, Bolivia once again broke diplomatic ties with Chile over 
the continued inability of the three states to resolve border issues and sovereign access to 
the sea. 
The months leading up to the War of the Pacific centennial in 1979, was riddled 
with headlines of impending war.  However, despite the rhetoric, military observers 
discounted a real possibility of war between Chile and Peru citing three reasons.  First, 
Peru could not concentrate its military forces along Chile’s border, because it also was 
engaged in border conflicts with Ecuador to its north.  The Peruvian Air Force was also 
finding it difficult to maintain their newly arrived Su-22 airplanes.136  Indeed, by 1978, 
the arms race appeared to have stalled.  Peru’s military had not entered into any new 
procurement agreements since mid-1977 and Peruvian officials announced its 12 year 
(and $3 billion) military modernization program “largely complete.”137  Moreover, Chile 
was hit with another more stringent U.S. weapons ban in 1979, which prohibited trade 
assistance.  This ban made it virtually impossible for the Chileans to receive the 
necessary spare parts to maintain their U.S. acquired aircraft and naval vessels, let alone 
acquire new equipment.138  Finally, Chile had been able to fortify its frontier to Peru with 
“pits, obstacles, mines and booby traps” to prevent a successful tank incursion.139   
The February 1979 anniversary date of the War of the Pacific passed without 
armed conflict.  Moreover, at the anniversary celebration in Santiago, General Pinochet 
called for friendly ties with Chile’s neighbors, and he played down the possibility of 
future confrontations.140  This was unofficially manifest through Peru’s brief 
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participation in Operation Condor, a protracted network of political oppression directed 
against leftists in the region during the 1970s.  As expected, Pinochet’s regime in Chile 
was an important and influential member in Condor. 
Both Peru and Ecuador joined the Condor “system” in 1978.  Moreover, despite 
Peru’s severed relations with Chile over the alleged military spying incident in 1978, 
Joint Condor operations continued to occur in Peru as late as June 1980, when a joint 
Condor team was sent to Lima to capture three Peruvian “subversives.”  Despite the 
Condor mission success, however, the operation blew up in the press—just one month 
before Peru’s transition to democracy.  As a result, Dinges suggests, “Peru was deeply 
embarrassed by its foray into Condor cooperation.”  Moreover, it came with a diplomatic 
cost.  Peru’s government, for instance, felt compelled to cancel its invitation to regional 
dignitaries to attend the inauguration ceremonies of Peru’s newly and democratically 
elected president later that month.141  
D. ANALYSIS OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS: 1968-1980 
The following section provides an explanation for the pattern of interstate 
relations, which developed between 1968 and 1980.  The traditional theories of economic 
and democratic peace were ineffective in explaining the dynamics, because both were 
nearly non-existent.  Thus, I found the bilateral relationship was, in fact, driven by a 
realist’s perception balance of power.  This was best evidenced through the ongoing 
acquisition of arms throughout the decade, as well as the attention afforded persistent 
border disputes. 
Nevertheless, competition was tempered by two important factors.  These include 
the “Balance of Identity” phenomenon, as well as the nontraditional use of confidence-
building measures throughout the decade. 
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1. Balance of Power 
In the “dogs eat dog” world of realism, states have no one to rely on but 
themselves for protection.  This type of behavior can be manifest through the rapid 
acquisition of arms (i.e., an arms race) or the taking (and defending) of territory (i.e.,, 
conquest).  Trinkunas and Barletta argue that balance of power behavior was prevalent in 
Latin America in the nineteenth century, but harder to find since the end of the Cold War 
period.142  Chile and Peru, however, trace the origins of their behavior to that era.  Early 
relations were defined by Chile’s acquisition of Peruvian (and Bolivian) territory in order 
to improve Chile…both strategically and economically.  Moreover, it seems the relative 
strength of both militaries has been an important are of concern, as well.  Such behavior 
continues to be evidenced in the late 20th century, as I have shown in the previous pages.  
For instance, the arms race, which began in the early 1970s, is a clear example of power 
politics.  General Velasco’s quote, for instance, sums up the situation.  “We are not going 
to wait around with our hands in our pockets,” he proclaimed in 1974, “while our 
neighbors make their purchases of equipment.”143   
In perfect tit-for-tat fashion, both Chile and Peru, throughout the decade, acquired 
more and more arms.  St John posits, for instance, that between 1968 and 1977 Peru’s per 
capita GNP rose only 40 percent, yet per capita military expenditures increased by over 
80 percent.  Most of the expansion occurred between 1974 and 1977.  As a result, and for 
the first time in more than a century, “Peru achieved military parity with Chile.”144  
Because of the regional challenges faced by the Pinochet administration in Argentina, 
Bolivia and Peru, the Chilean government also continued throughout the 1970s to invest 
heavily in the defense sector.  For example, Chile’s military spending increased from 
U.S.$177 million in 1972 to U.S.$984 million in 1980.  Moreover, the size of its armed 
forces more than doubled in the same period.145  It was not until the late 1970s, when 
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internal political and economic forces affected Peru that its acquisition of arms began to 
cease.  Moreover, by the late 1970s, the Pinochet regime had become politically isolated.  
The military became unable to acquire sophisticated arms from primary sources.  
The same brand of power politics also occurred with respect to land.  As I 
indicated earlier, Velasco instilled a sense of “revenge” in the military academy and 
wished to recover Peru’s lost land before he died.146  On the other side of the border, 
Pinochet argued that Chile’s nineteenth century expansion northward was a justifiable 
and closed matter of lebensraum.147  It took more than 40 years for the governments of 
Chile, Peru and Bolivia to reach a treaty formally ending the War of the Pacific.  Since 
the 1929 Treaty of Lima, however, major issues still linger.  Between 1968 and 1980, this 
was evidenced with the mandated tripartite negotiations to address Bolivia’s appeal for 
sovereign sea access.  Chile’s resolve to maintain its territorial integrity, and thus its 
“power” with respect to its neighbors, resulted in the severance of relations with Bolivia 
in 1978.   
At the same time, Chile was trying to maintain (or achieve) military superiority 
through spying on Peruvian military bases.  When the scandal was exposed, as I have 
already explained, relations between the two countries were severed.  These examples 
clearly demonstrate that “under anarchy [in the international system] states must struggle 
to preserve their security and independence.”148  However, at the same time realist forces 
were in play, two additional factors kept competition in check. 
2. Balance of Identity 
While realist forces were evident behind the arms race and the resolve to maintain 
territorial integrity, an additional theory helps explain some of the dynamics of the 
interstate relations between Chile and Peru during this period—a balance of identity.  The 
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theory borrows from Barletta and Trinkunas’ use of the concept.  They argue, for 
example, that “an actor’s identity is their sense of who they are and who they are not; 
what they stand for and what they are against.”149  I posit that such identity is reflected in 
the ideology of a regime.  As such, regimes “identify other actors as adversaries or allies 
in terms of others’ perceived identities [or ideologies].”150 
With respect to Chile and Peru, this was first evidenced in 1970 when two like-
minded governments worked together to develop a common Latin American position 
with regards to maritime boundaries.151  Despite the military nature of Peru’s 
administration, for example, both states were led by progressive reformers, with land 
reform as key parts of their platforms.  Hopes for ideological cooperation continued with 
the election of Salvador Allende in Chile.  As noted, the left-leaning Velasco regime in 
Peru held cautious optimism for his administration.  For a few years, the “blossoming 
Havana-Lima-Santiago axis” kept tensions in check even as Allende increased defense 
spending in an effort to appease the military.152   
Though arms acquisitions were taking place between the left-leaning Velasco and 
Allende regimes, the flaming rhetoric only started once Pinochet came to power.  Indeed, 
both Velasco and Pinochet were authoritarian military regimes, but their ideologies were 
on opposite ends of the spectrum.  For instance, while Velasco implemented a policy of 
social and land reform, Pinochet’s regime was pursuing extensive measures of 
conservative economic liberalization.  Such differences in political ideology provide a 
potential explanation for the rapid acquisition of arms.   
In 1975, General Morales succeeded Velasco as military president.  Morales 
shifted the military regime in a rightist direction and particularly sought to improve 
relations with Chile. Peru’s eventual participation in Operation Condor, for instance, 
provides some indication.  Indeed, the network was a tool used by right-wing 
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governments to eliminate a common “leftist” threat.  Peru’s official participation with 
Chile, a principle and founding member, represents a significant secret alliance based on 
ideology.   
However, despite a shared identity, flare-ups did occur.  However, this was 
primarily because Morales was too weak to contain them.  For instance, the nationalistic 
fervor, which surrounded the War of the Pacific anniversary in 1979, was outside the 
control of Morales.  Moreover, the spy scandal demanded swift action on the part of 
Peru’s government in order to maintain peace.  Morales was thus obligated to act, but 
within limits.  By decade’s end, however, Pinochet publicly called for improved relations 
with Peru and an end to the potential for conflict.153  Thus, even in the midst of power 
politics, it seems regime ideology remained an important consideration in understanding 
the dynamics of Peru-Chile relations. 
3. Confidence Building Measures 
A third area, which helped to define Peru-Chile relations in the 1970s, was the use 
of confidence building measures.  In the realm of power politics, CBMs are seemingly 
used as “window dressing” to appease the international community.  On one hand, they 
are just a mask to the liberal international community, behind which they can hide their 
motives to increase their power, all the while touting their measures as “peace loving.”   
On the other hand, however, confidence-building measures can be viewed as the 
first step in truly reconciling international differences between conflicting, or potentially 
conflicting states.  While analysts of CBMs are always careful to note that CBMs by 
themselves cannot bring peace, the focus of the literature on cases where interstate 
relations have improved greatly (Southern Cone and Central America) has inadvertently 
contributed to a perception that CBMs are the first step on the road to peace.  That clearly 
did not happen in Chile-Peru.   
I argue that neither definition for the use of confidence building measures is 
relevant for Chile and Peru during this era.  This use of confidence building measures, 
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with respect to my discussion of balance of power and balance of ideology, demonstrates 
that the realist actors of the decade understood the need to defend their national interests, 
while at the same time preventing escalation.  In essence, both states did what they 
needed to protect their national security, while at the same time prevented the occurrence 
of armed conflict.  
E. CONCLUSION 
As I have illustrated, the relationship between Chile and Peru, as evidenced 
between 1968 and 1980, was complicated.  The dynamics of this relationship are 
evidenced across a broad spectrum of regime types and regime ideologies.  Moreover, 
during the period, historical balance of power issues continued to define the relationship 
between the two states.  The need for power—tempered or complicated with similarities 
in regime ideology—delivered an environment, many times, at the brink of war.  At the 
same time, confidence-building measures were developed and implemented between the 
states.  However, the CBMs that were enacted met neither of the traditional definitions.  
CBMs were used to prevent escalation at the same time Chile and Peru sought to defend 
their own national interests.  Though tensions did mount throughout the decade, Peru and 
Chile never resorted to armed conflict.  Moreover, a similar ideology at the close of the 
decade led to tacit cooperation between the governments of Chile and Peru, despite 
overtly severed diplomatic relations.  
In the following chapter, I continue my discussion of Peru-Chile international 
relations.  I begin with the year 1980, a time when Peru’s government transitioned to 
democracy and Chile’s military strengthened its grip on control.  Bilateral relations 
during this period appear to improve, as arms purchases diminish and territorial solutions 
are reached.  By the early years of the 2000s, however, traditional animosities reemerge.  
That is where my discussion ends.  
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III. TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter ended with broken diplomatic relations between Chile and Peru.  
This action accurately symbolized the relationship in international relations, which had 
developed between the two countries leading up to 1980.  In the two decades that 
followed, however, the dynamics at work fundamentally shifted.   
This chapter describes the significantly improved relations between Chile and 
Peru from 1980 to 2000.  Relations were restored and measures of confidence were 
increasingly introduced.  Early in the decade, the two governments established the need 
to address lingering issues pertaining to the 1929 Treaty of Lima.  Despite some initial 
missteps, by 1999, both sides had approved measures putting to rest issues more than 70 
years old.  Indeed, during this period interstate relations between Chile and Peru seemed 
to be heading down the same path as relations between Argentina and Chile and 
Argentina and Brazil: a time when lingering border disputes were resolved and historical 
rivalries supplanted by a new era of economic and political partnerships. 
The chapter shows that this process of rapprochement was correlated closely with 
transitions to democracy, first in Peru in 1980 and then in Chile in 1990.  In stark contrast 
to theories that predict increased interstate conflict during democratization, the Peruvian 
and Chilean cases reveal executives in new democracies with strong incentives to reach 
out to their neighbors and resolve disputes as part of a broader effort to assert control 
over the military establishment.  However, this was far from the Democratic Peace 
theory; democracies did not reach out to fellow democracies because of their confidence 
in shared norms and procedures.  Indeed, the initiative for improved relations in the 
1980s came from the first two presidents of the new Peruvian democracy, who made 
overtures to the Pinochet government in Chile, which remained brutally authoritarian.  
After the transition to democracy in Chile in 1990, the impetus for improved relations 
came from the first two presidents of the new Chilean democracy, who interacted with 
the increasingly authoritarian regime of President Alberto Fujimori.   
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The description of improved interstate relations in the next two sections and the 
more in-depth analysis of these changes in the third section will show how civil-military 
relations in the new democracies drove interstate relations.  The history of Chilean-
Peruvian relations from 1980-2000 also demonstrates the importance of understanding 
not only executive preferences but also their ability to act on these preferences: the initial 
agreement between Presidents Aylwin and Fujimori to resolve lingering disputes 
foundered in the Peruvian Congress.  It would be five years before a new accord could be 
fashioned and Fujimori could summon support in Congress for its approval. 
B. IMPROVED INTERSTATE RELATIONS:  1980-1990 
The improvement in interstate relations between Chile and Peru during the 1980s 
owes much of its success to the democratization of Peru.  Under the inaugural democratic 
administration of President Belaúnde, Peru began a period of normalization of both its 
civil-military and interstate relations.  Belaúnde did not seek actively to reduce the 
prerogatives held by the military, though the relative role and influence of the military 
began to decline as officers left the executive palace for the barracks.  The lack of a 
concerted effort to assert civilian control over the military and circumscribe its role in 
defining conflict scenarios led to only modest changes in interstate relations: Belaúnde, 
for example, restored relations with Pinochet’s Chile and attempted to mediate a peace 
during the Falklands-Malvinas crisis.  At the same time, however, he led Peru to a series 
of brief armed skirmishes with Ecuador.  Under Alan García’s administration, in contrast, 
efforts to assert civilian control over Peru’s armed forces were intensified and matched 
by increased efforts to improve interstate relations.  This led to further cuts in defense 
spending, as well as the creation of a new Ministry of Defense designed to assert civilian 
control.  During this time, Peru also made increased overtures in the region designed to 
curb arms appending and resolve territorial disputes.  Efforts to improve relations were 
positively received by a Pinochet regime, which was making a concerted effort to reduce 
the international isolation that had resulted from its repressive domestic policies and 
aggressive foreign policy of the 1970s.  The following section provides more details.  
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1. Belaúnde (1980-1985): Modest Normalization of Civil-Military and 
Interstate Relations 
Peru was among the first of several Latin American countries to rid itself of 
military authoritarian rule during the third wave of democratization, in 1980.  Peru’s 
transition to democracy, however, was soon usurped by terror.  In the first 180 days of 
President Fernando Belaúnde’s new administration, the growing Maoist insurgency 
movement, the Shining Path, committed some 232 acts of terror within Peru.  Indeed, the 
growing insurgency required the new administration to give primacy in addressing its 
internal problems.  As a result of this unprecedented violence, by the end of 1982, 
Belaúnde was forced to suspend constitutional guarantees and declare a national state of 
emergency throughout much of Peru.154  
Despite the increased focus on counter insurgency, however, the reemergence of 
democracy in Peru brought with it a period characterized by normalization—a 
rectification of situations appropriate to a new democracy, but with no grand vision or 
projects of civilian control.  For example, Hunter argues that when the Peruvian military 
left government in 1980, they also left many military prerogatives intact.155  Foremost, 
for instance, the administration left the defense budget and arms acquisition processes 
alone.156  In addition, the Joint Command remained involved in state planning, while the 
military continued to participate on the National Defense Council (NDC).157  Thus, as 
Obando notes, Peru’s military retained significant prerogatives, especially relating to 
Peru’s foreign policy decisions.  The war scenarios traditionally related to Chile and 
Ecuador continued to be accepted by the Belaúnde government without significant 
changes from previous regimes.158   
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However, although Belaúnde did not “aggressively” seek to limit the military’s 
role, the exercise of these powers contracted sharply under his administration.159  For 
example, the Belaúnde administration seldom convened the NDC.  This, Hunter posits, 
“effectively confined military influence in politics.”  Moreover, she argues, Peruvian 
officers themselves sought to withdraw from politics “after the divisive effects…of 
military rule.”160  Also under Belaúnde’s watch, military expenditures significantly 
decreased.  Between 1969 and 1979, military spending constituted 24 percent of public 
sector outlays.  Between 1980 and 1985, however, this percentage decreased to 18.161   
Externally, St John notes, “the first foreign policy issue addressed by the 
Belaúnde government was the border dispute with Ecuador.”162  Throughout the late 
1960s and 1970s, relations between Peru and Ecuador had been amicable.  However, the 
situation began to change in the late 1970s when the two states began to diverge on 
several bilateral issues.  The resultant disagreement led Peru and Ecuador to engage in 
several armed skirmishes in the early months of 1981.  Though Peru emerged the victor, 
the terms of the cease-fire failed to provide “for a demarcation of the boundary.”163  This 
would come to haunt the Peruvian government again in the mid-1990s. 
In the early part of the decade, the Belaúnde government took a number of foreign 
policy decisions that undermined improved relations with Chile.  For instance, in 1982, 
Peru’s government refused to sign the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.  
Peruvian authorities argued the convention was a “hasty, unconstitutional decision that 
necessitated further discussion.”164  That same year, Belaúnde sympathized with the 
government of Argentina’s position concerning the Falklands-Malvinas Islands.  Peru 
under Belaúnde “attempted to mediate a peaceful solution to the dispute “in contrast to 
Pinochet’s pledge of Chilean support for Great Britain.  Moreover, when the Bolivian 
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government brought sovereign access to the sea to the forefront once again in 1983, 
President Belaúnde held fast to the insistence of Peruvian involvement “in any 
substantive negotiations” with Chile.165   
Despite these foreign policy differences, however, significant actions did take 
place under Belaúnde’s administration, which ultimately improved overall ties with 
Chile.  In April 1981, for example, Peru and Chile managed to restore full diplomatic 
relations.  As noted earlier, Peru’s military government had severed formal relations with 
Chile in response to the military spy incident in the late 1970s.  With the restoration of 
relations, a Peruvian communiqué announced the Peruvian government’s anticipation of 
a “closer” and “more effective” relationship with its estranged neighbor.166  Moreover, in 
1982, on the thirtieth anniversary of the Declaration of Santiago (with which the 
governments of Peru, Chile and Ecuador established common fishing privileges within a 
200-mile offshore limit), the Peruvian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Guillermo 
Llosa Pautrat, paid an unprecedented visit to his Chilean counterpart, Lt Gen Sergio 
Covarrubias, in Santiago, during which they discussed issues pertaining to relations and 
cooperation between Chile and Peru.  According to the press release, “they stressed the 
importance of regular diplomatic consultations taking place between the two countries.”  
In addition, they also reaffirmed the principles enshrined in the charters of the United 
Nations and the Organization of American States, such as the self-determination of 
peoples, non-intervention, the equality of states, non-use or threat of use of force, the 
commitment to respect treaties and other international obligations, as well as the intent to 
resolve disputes by peaceful means and under international law.  The ministers also 
agreed to resolve unresolved issues dating to the 1929 Treaty of Lima (i.e., the 
construction of a wharf, train station and customs house in Arica), though a specific date 
and agenda for talks were not set.167   
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In 1981, the government of Chile announced a new and proactive foreign policy 
“so as to be present, if possible, in all international events, to show that Chile is a 
progressive country…”  This rapprochement, Muñoz argues, was initially put in place 
with several Central American Nations.168  Moreover, in 1982, the Reagan administration 
in the United States suspended many of the diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed 
against Chile by the previous Carter administration.  Nevertheless, Chile’s political 
isolation continued.  Muñoz argues that, under the Pinochet regime, prominent world 
leaders consistently ignored Chile.  Moreover, the quality of relations Chile did manage 
to maintain was quite poor.  He cites as examples the “unprecedented support” Bolivia 
was offered in 1979 in defense of its maritime access claim, and Chile’s inability to 
gather international support in its spat with Argentina, as evidence of Chile’s poor 
international relations.169  And Chile’s image also suffered in other ways.  Internal 
dissent within Chile was beginning to grow in the mid 1980s.  A deep economic crisis in 
1982 led to near 30 percent unemployment.  Moreover, opposition forces were beginning 
to coalesce during this time, calling for “resistance and massive demonstrations against 
the [Pinochet] regime.”  “That was the tone between 1983 and 1986, “Montes and Vial 
posit, “when the military government was under strong social and political pressure.”170  
As a result, the government was forced to respond with “a shrewd mixture of repression 
and political maneuvering….”171   
2. García (1985-1990):  A Project of Civilian Control and Good 
Neighbor Policies 
President Alan García assumed Peru’s presidency in July 1985.  In line with his 
desire to assert control over the military, it is not surprising that, at the behest of his 
administration, the foreign ministers of Chile and Peru (as well as Ecuador) agreed in 
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November 1985 to initiate a process of consultation and negotiation.  Though arms 
acquisitions by both parties had been comparatively low in the first part of the decade, 
negotiations ultimately led to a spending cap on military hardware, the building of mutual 
confidence, and a meeting of senior military commanders from both countries.172  
Similar in impetus to the Ayacucho Declaration, “Peru considered it essential to further 
regional disarmament so that resources spent on armaments could be directed toward 
development goals.”173  As a result, between June 1986 and August 1992, the 
governments in Chile and Peru successfully exercised seven rounds of talks concerning 
arms limitations.174  It was in this environment that García decided to cut the air force’s 
order of 26 Mirage jet aircraft.175   
In addition to an agreement limiting arms purchases, Peru and Chile’s 
governments also held subsequent negotiations, which addressed the withdrawal of 
military forces along their border.  García also made overtures to Ecuador and Bolivia, 
sending his foreign minister to hold high-level meeting focused on resolving long-
standing border disputes.  President García even “indicated to Bolivia that his 
government would accept Chilean cession of a strip of land to Bolivia to provide the 
latter with access to the sea,” which marked a significant foreign policy shift from the 
General Morales administration..176  Moreover, the armed forces’ ability to determine 
who Peru’s enemies were also decreased under García.  While Belaúnde had approved 
both the Ecuador and Chile war scenarios, García did not, removing Chile as an 
option.177 
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Initially, “the armed forces assumed a positive attitude toward the new 
president.”178  However, the economic crisis, which existed in Peru at the time García, 
came to power in 1985 proved overwhelming.  As a result, a “credible fear” of military 
intervention pervaded the remainder of his administration.  Therefore, Obando asserts, 
“the main objective of President García relative to the armed forces was to control 
them.”179  Indeed, he posits that the civilian administration carried out such measures by 
“intervening actively” in the internal operations of the military, which led to an “even 
greater reduction in the power of the armed forces at the national level.”180   
For instance, García made significant cuts to defense spending.  Military 
expenditures under his watch represented only 2.4 percent of Peru’s GDP, down from 
4.19 percent under Belaúnde.181  In addition, the García administration significantly 
modified the structure of the national defense system.  Against the wishes of the armed 
forces, a new Ministry of Defense was created that combined the existing military 
ministries with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Secretariat of Defense.  While 
the creation of a single Ministry of Defense “was not a bad one,” Obando argues, the 
problem was that García used it not to promote efficiency, but rather as an institution 
better suited to control the power and influence of the military.  Finally, the civilian 
administration began to co-opt military appointments to the high command.182   
The co-option of high-ranking officials coupled with the severe economic crisis 
almost completely eliminated the armed forces’ ability “to press for the approval of the 
military budget and acquisitions.”  Indeed, the armed forces lacked even “the minimal 
tools required to accomplish its mission,” including gasoline, spare vehicle parts or even 
ammunition and uniforms.183  Military income was also slashed, severely affecting troop 
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morale.  This produced an increased number of early retirements, further reducing the 
power and influence of Peru’s military institution.  At the same time, García also stepped 
up his assault on human rights violations committed by the military in their fight against 
the Shining Path.  In addition, while Belaúnde had offered significant autonomy for 
human rights violations, García did not.  Over the course of his administration, he fired a 
president of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and several regional military chiefs for such 
offenses.  Moreover, “judicial proceedings were begun against [other] members of the 
armed forces for human rights abuses.”184   
Within military circles, García was coming under increasing scrutiny.  All of the 
conditions of decreased military power and influence, Obando comments, “combined to 
produce great dissension within the armed forces and led some officers to begin planning 
to overthrow the government.”  By the end of García’s term in 1990, at least two coups 
were being planned against the president and the “traitors” of the military high command, 
in order to correct the fact that, as Obando concludes, “the armed forces [had] lost nearly 
all of their capacity to exert pressure on the Peruvian state during the García period.”185  
This would change under the subsequent administrations of President Alberto Fujimori 
(1990-2000). 
C. RELATIONS UNDER CHILEAN DEMOCRACY:  1990-2000  
Just as Peru’s transition to democracy in the 1980s provided the impetus for 
improved relations with Chile, Chile’s transition to democracy in 1990 led to repeated 
Chilean initiatives to improve interstate relations throughout the 1990s.  Patricio Aylwin 
brought to Chile in 1990 a desire to restore his country to the community of nations, and 
to assert civilian control over the military.  The latter project was hindered by the 
numerous prerogatives enshrined in the Chilean constitution and Pinochet’s status as 
head of the armed forces.  One arena in which Aylwin was able to pursue this agenda was 
internationally, where his government set out to resolve all outstanding border disputes.  
                                                 
184 Obando, “The Power of Peru’s Armed Forces,” in Peru in Crisis: Dictatorship or Democracy? 
111-112. 
185 Ibid., 112-3. 
 50
Aylwin’s successor, President Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), helped to complete this agenda 
and added his own stamp to the linked efforts to control the military and improve 
interstate relations.  Frei focused his efforts on creating a framework for the professional 
democratic management of the defense sector (e.g., writing a white paper) and 
professionalization of the armed forces.  This project carried with it certain implications 
for relations with Peru-most notably, an increase in military and diplomatic exchanges 
with Peru and the professional resolution of differences.  Indeed, Fujimori sought to 
repair his image in the years following his self-coup.  Cooperation with regional and 
international partners helped his cause.   
1. Aylwin (1990-1994): Civilian Control and Good Neighbor Policies 
In 1990, as Chile began its transition to democracy, Aylwin sought to subordinate 
Chile’s military, as well as restore his nation’s legitimacy.  Under his administration, for 
example, Chile reestablished diplomatic ties with Mexico, Cuba and the Soviet Union.  
The return to democracy, also allowed Chile to mend its relations fully with the United 
States.  Ultimately, Aylwin sought to reestablish Chile’s participation “in the political 
context of regional, democratic cooperation.”186  This is perhaps best evidenced with 
Aylwin’s policy towards Argentina.  Parish notes that Aylwin favored the lowering of 
regional tensions, the resolution of border disputes, as well as the increasing cross border 
economic activity.187  During his presidency, for example, Aylwin, with Argentina’s 
Menem, “signed a bundle of treaties and executive agreements” which ultimately led to 
the resolution of border issues and promoted cross border investment.  However, at the 
same time, Schneider argues, “Aylwin faced the task of establishing democracy with the 
dictator [Pinochet] still in control of the army and vetoing any punishment of his 
regime…”188   
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Indeed, the 1980 Constitution had installed a number of prerogatives designed to 
control and influence the regime following its transition to democracy.  The constitution, 
for example, limited the legislative representation of the opposition.  Popular 
representation in Congress was checked through the appointment of nine “designated” 
senators—more than a quarter of the thirty-five-member chamber.189  Of these nine 
senators, four were reserved for the former commanders in chief of every branch of 
Chile’s armed forces.  In addition, the constitution guaranteed a strong and powerful 
military.  The Constitution provided for the creation of a National Security Council, 
headed by the President, with the power to “convey to any organ of the state its opinion 
on any act, event or matter that gravely attempted against the bases of the institutionality 
or that jeopardized national security.”190  Moreover, civilian control over the armed 
forces was severely limited.  Though the president maintained the authority to appoint the 
commanders of each of the military services and the director general of the national 
police, nominees had to be selected from a list of the five highest-ranking officers with 
greatest seniority.  Once a commander was appointed, that appointee was “safe” from 
presidential dismissal unless qualified charges were brought against him.191   
Nevertheless, during Aylwin’s administration, the neighboring governments of 
Bolivia and Peru had reached a bilateral agreement allowing Bolivia to establish shipping 
and customs operations in the Peruvian port of Ilo.  However, at the same time, Chile and 
Peru maintained formal discussions to implement the unresolved mandates fully of the 
1929 treaty.  The Treaty of Lima had called for Chile to construct a wharf for Peru in 
Arica, as well as a build a terminal for the Tacna-Arica railway.  At the outset of 
Aylwin’s first term in 1990, the terms of the 1929 agreements had “still not been honored 
in full.”192  
In February 1993, however, the Chilean government announced that Aylwin had 
instructed his foreign minister to resolve “all existing border disputes” by December of 
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that year.193  As part of Aylwin’s goal to improve regional relations, representatives from 
Chile and Peru reopened formal negotiations in 1993 to discuss the full implementation 
of the 1929 treaty.  By May, both parties reached an agreement referred to as the “Lima 
Conventions” which appeared, at least initially, to resolve all lingering issues with the 
1929 treaty.  However, as St John notes, however, the accords were soon “set aside.”194  
Despite the fact that Fujimori’s party held a slim majority in Congress, the agreement 
failed to muster sufficient support in Peru’s Congress and was withdrawn from the table 
in 1994.195  Moreover, little additional progress was made over the next four years, as 
Peruvian officials became increasingly preoccupied with Peru’s border dispute with 
Ecuador.196  
In the early 1990s, Peruvian forces were directed against a resurgent border 
conflict with Ecuador.  By 1992, nearly 60% of Peru’s army was concentrated on its 
northern border.197  However, at the same time, Peru’s military was largely unprepared 
for either conventional or counterinsurgency warfare.  According to news reports, 
military officers were demoralized by low salaries—$250/month for a general—while 
desertion rates were as high as 40%.198  Moreover, Jaskoski points out, the Peruvian 
armed forces throughout the 1990s were increasingly mired in corruption.  “The armed 
forces benefited financially from illegal arms deals and extensive participation in the 
cocaine trade, a business that thoroughly corrupted the military.”199  This corruption was 
so extensive, she continues, “that it was identified as a key reason for why the Peruvian  
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armed forces were defeated militarily by their Ecuadorian counterparts.”200  Thus, for 
various reasons, it was unsurprising that, when war did break out with Ecuador in 1995, 
Peru’s military performed poorly.   
Nonetheless, it was during this time that the armed forces of Chile and Peru were 
able to make advances in the way of cooperation.  Both parties agreed to a series of 
military exchanges in professional activities, Caro notes.  These included military 
academy cadet exchanges, as well as exchange visits by active-duty military personnel.  
These also included meetings hosted by “commanders of frontier garrisons and naval 
areas.”  At the follow-on meeting in 1992, additional progress was made in bilateral 
cooperation.  The Chilean armed forces hosted their Peruvian counterparts at Chile’s 
Center of Aerospace Medicine.  Peru also sent medical experts to Chile’s Army hospital.  
In addition, the two sides also agreed to cooperate in the Antarctic, undertake combined 
military exercises, and jointly participate in conferences on issues of intelligence.201 
2. Frei (1994-2000): Modern Management of the Military and Interstate 
Relations 
Eduardo Frei assumed the Chilean presidency in 1994.  The foreign policy 
initiatives of his administration sought to consolidate the successes of Chile’s new 
international image. This was carried out through the continued internationalization of the 
economy, the development of stable relations and “the promotion of an environment 
favorable to democratic stability.”202  For instance, in 1994, the bilateral Peruvian-
Chilean parliamentary association was established in order to promote cooperation 
among legislatures.203  Moreover, OAS member states, in 1995, reaffirmed their 
commitment to using CBMs with the Declaration of Santiago on Confidence and Security 
                                                 
200 Jaskoski, “Evaluating Civilian Control across Policy Arenas in Latin America: Lessons from 
Peru,” forthcoming in Militares y Política en América Latina y el Caribe. 
201 Caro, “Peaceful Cooperation and CBMs in Chile,” in Confidence-building Measures in Latin 
America. 
202 Morandé, “The Invisible Hand and Contemporary Foreign Policy,” in Latin American and 
Caribbean Foreign Policy, 255-6. 
203 Ricardo Kompatzki Contreras, “Encuentros y Desencuentros en las Relaciones Chileno-Peruanas 
Durante el Siglo XX y XXI,” in Nuestro Vecinos, ed. Mario Artaza Rouxel and Paz Millet García 
(Santiago: RIL Editores, 2007), 548. 
 54
Building Measures.  While the declaration outlined CBMs to foster defense related 
confidence, it also stressed the need to cooperate in the event of natural disasters and to 
develop education programs for peace.204  It was during this time, also, that Chile 
renewed its ties with MERCOSUR (severed since 1976).205  
In October 1998, the governments of Peru and Ecuador put an end to “longest 
standing boundary dispute in the Americas.”206  This Global and Definitive Peace 
Agreement, as it was called, was significant for the region, as it helped “put a brake” on 
military spending and fostered economic development along the border region.207  The 
successful peace negotiated between Ecuador and Peru sparked a renewed desire for both 
Peru and Chile to readdress their outstanding border issues, on hold since 1994.  Indeed, 
Fujimori’s administration was quick to respond.208  After nearly a year of grueling 
negotiations, the Foreign Ministers of Peru and Chile signed a package of documents that 
“collectively executed the 1929 treaty and additional protocol and ended 70 years of 
controversy.”209  Moreover, in an extra show of good will, the government of Chile 
returned to Peru 200 books and documents, which had been looted by Chilean forces at 
the end of the War of the Pacific.210   
The accord was a success in Peru this time around, for several reasons.  Towards 
the end of the decade, signs of “Fuji fatigue” were becoming evident in Peru.  While the 
Shining Path insurgency had been quelled for the most part, acts of terrorism remained 
chronic.  Moreover, Fujimori’s regime was increasingly hammered with scandals.211  
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Around the same time, too, Degregori notes, Peru’s military took a serious blow.  General 
Hermoza, head of Peru’s military, was seen by the international community as overtly 
bellicose following Peru’s declaration of peace with Ecuador.  At the urging of the 
international community, especially the United States, Fujimori sacked Hermoza—giving 
full control of the military to Fujimori and his confidant, Montesinos.212       
With Hermoza out of the picture, Fujimori had more room in which to maneuver 
politically.  Moreover, by this time, he had achieved majority support in congress.  Thus, 
the “Act of Execution” was signed in November 1999.  It addressed the construction of a 
wharf, a train station and a customs house in Arica.213  St John notes that the settlement 
“was generally well received in both Chile and Peru.”  In addition, less than three weeks 
after the signing of the formal agreements, President Fujimori conducted the first official 
state visit of a Peruvian president to Chile.  Chilean President Eduardo Frei later 
reciprocated with his visit to Peru in February 2000.214 
D. ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 1980-2000 
Snyder and Mansfield contend that the 1990s turned out to be a decade of 
“democratization and chronic nationalist conflict, both within and between some 
transitional states.”215  I argue, however, that this was not the case with respect to the 
relationship between the governments of Chile and Peru.  Indeed, as my research in the 
preceding sections has evidenced, the decades of the 1980s and 1990s symbolized an era 
of improving relations between two historic enemies.   
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To the extent presidents in newly democratic countries identified civilian control 
of the military as a central objective, they sought improved interstate relations as a means 
to this end.  However, in addition to understanding this incentive for presidential action, 
it is necessary to understand when executives were able to act on their preferences and 
redefine interstate relations.   
The preferences of actors, I posit, are important in defining interstate relations.  
Sotomayor, for instance, argues that the presidents of two newly emerging democracies 
of the 1980s—Argentina and Brazil—sought to contain their militaries and retain civilian 
control.216  Moreover, by recognizing each other as allies, the civilian leaders were 
further able to reduce the threat that the armed forces would act on historical bilateral 
grievances.217  Sotomayor’s argument, however, suggests that executive preferences can 
only be shared between like-minded democrats.  As I have evidenced in this chapter, 
however, this is not the case.  Democratically elected executives in new democracies also 
demonstrated strong incentives to reach out to their authoritarian neighbor in order to 
resolve historical disputes, as part of ongoing efforts to reassert civilian control over their 
militaries.  This was evidenced in Peruvian relations toward Chile in the 1980s, and 
conversely, Chilean overtures to Peru throughout the 1990s. 
However, actors need to have the capacity to act.  Parish suggests, for instance, 
that bilateral cooperation is most effective when actors have the ability to implement their 
decisions.218  Indeed, the executive’s ability to act is greatly influenced by his 
relationship with the legislature, political opposition parties as well as the military.219  
The following addresses that ability.   
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1. The 1980s: Cooperation under a Democratic Peru 
In 1980, Peru shed twelve years of military authoritarianism.  When Belaúnde 
assumed his mandate to power, his immediate focus was in the normalization of 
governance.  Though he did not actively seek to establish strong civilian control of the 
military, as Hunter has noted, the military’s powers noticeably shrank under his 
administration.220  When García assumed office, however, he vigorously asserted civilian 
control of the military.  He made significant cuts in the defense sector, for instance, and 
modified the structure of the defense ministry to favor civilian control.  Hence, either 
actively or passively, the Peruvian presidents of the 1980s effectively asserted control 
over the military. This, I posit, allowed them the increased ability to act on their 
preferences.   
As a result, we see the overtures of peace extended to Peru’s neighbors at this 
time.  However, why was the Chilean government receptive to these initiatives?  Indeed, 
during the 1980s, Pinochet’s military regime was in near absolute control of all aspects 
political.  However, Pinochet and his regime had significant incentive to accept Peru’s 
conciliatory advances, because Chile’s government in the 1980s was becomingly 
increasingly isolated.  As Muñoz pointed out, for example, Chile’s military government 
had found it necessary to devise a proactive foreign policy in 1980, in order to 
demonstrate to the international community that Chile was a “progressive country.”221  
Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s, Chile’s political isolation increased.  Even the U.S. 
began providing support for Pinochet opposition movements throughout the 1980s.222  
Thus, by acquiescing to international overtures of peace and conciliation, Pinochet and 
his regime were better postured to show the world that Chile was, in fact, a progressive 
country.   
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2. The 1990s: Cooperation under a Democratic Chile 
In the 1990s, cooperation initiatives between Peru and Chile continued.  However, 
the roles had essentially been reversed.  This time it was the efforts of Presidents Aylwin 
and Frei who led the charge from a resilient Chile, while Peru suffered a series of 
democratic setbacks under Fujimori. Nevertheless, Fujimori’s and his regime also had 
incentives to be receptive to his neighbor. 
As I have illustrated, the preferences of both the Aylwin and Frei administrations 
consisted of restoring Chile’s image with respect to the international community.  As 
such, they had strong incentives to reach out to an authoritarian Peru, as part of a larger 
and ongoing effort to subordinate the military.  Chile’s armed forces, however, retained 
significant prerogatives.  As a result, both Aylwin and Frei were potentially constrained 
in their ability to act.  Presumably, I argue, the Chilean military could have exercised a 
veto over some of the decisions advanced by either Aylwin or Frei.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to note, that despite the strength of Chile’s military, both Aylwin and Frei were 
successful in advancing their agenda towards Peru.  This indicates that, at least with 
respect to Peruvian policy, the preferences of the military were in line with the executive. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the decade, military prerogatives did begin to erode.  
Pinochet had retired as head of the military, for example, as had a number of Supreme 
Court judges.223  Moreover, the Frei administration had attempted to push a number of 
constitutional reforms through congress.  As a result, Chilean democrats had an 
increasing ability throughout the 1990s to act on their preferences.   
At the same time, Fujimori in Peru faced increased incentives to accept Chilean 
initiatives.  During the 1990s, for example, democratic institutions in Peru were 
increasingly marginalized.  In 1992, Fujimori consolidated his grip on power via a self-
coup establishing a virtually authoritarian regime.224  Fujimori sought to aggressively 
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combat insurgency, control hyperinflation and combat corruption.225  However, while he 
succeeded in controlling the first two, Fujimori failed miserably in combating the last.  
Thus, by mid-decade his domestic popularity was low.226  Fujimori needed a way to 
augment his grip on authority leading into mid-decade.  He sought to accomplish this by 
seeking legitimacy from the international community.  And “playing nice” with Chile, I 
argue, effectively demonstrated to the international community that Peru was, in fact, 
worthy of the legitimacy which it sought. 
Fujimori, however, was initially constrained in his ability to cooperate with Chile.  
The settlement of border issues, which both sides agreed to in 1994, was rejected by 
Peru’s parliament that same year, thus reflecting his inability to act on his preferences.  
By the end of the decade, however, the situation was fundamentally different.  
“Fujimori’s recovery in 1999 was one of the most astonishing political feats of the 
decade,” Degregori posits.227  At that time, Degregori contends, Fujimori faced only a 
“very unimpressive opposition,” consisting of stale political parties built around 
“caudillos.”228  Thus, Fujimori was politically empowered to act on his desire to resolve 
the lingering border issues with Chile.   
Thus, throughout the 1990s, the newly emerging democratic presidents in Chile 
sought to restore Chile’s image to the international community.  Aylwin and Frei 
accomplished this through their attempts at subordinating the military, while at the same 
time reaching out to regional and international neighbors—including Peru.  Though 
authoritarian in nature, Fujimori’s regime had incentive to accept Chilean advances.  This 
action, I argue, provided Fujimori a mechanism with which to garner international 
legitimacy.  His efforts were constrained early in his regime, as his popularity remained  
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low.  He could not muster the strength in Congress to approve the settlement reached 
with Chile.  However, by the end of the decade, Fujimori’s authority was more secure.  
As a result, Peru’s longstanding dispute with Chile was put to rest. 
E. CONCLUSION   
The 1980s and 1990s symbolize an era of burgeoning peace between two historic 
enemies. Indeed, the impetus for this traces its roots to the reestablishment of democracy 
first in Peru in 1980, then in Chile in 1990.  However, the resultant peace is not part of 
the traditional democratic theory of peace.  As I have evidenced, cooperation was 
advanced by a democratizing Peru in the 1980s against an authoritarian regime in Chile.  
Conversely, the trend continued throughout the 1990s, with Chile making advances 
despite the authoritarian regime in Peru. 
Democratization in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s involved the 
subordination of the military.  At the same time, the executives also looked to normalize 
governance and reassert their position within the world community.  To do this, they 
sought rapprochement with their neighbors and historical enemies.  In addition, the 
military control the civilian leaders were able to assert provided the room necessary for 





IV. RENEWED BILATERAL THREATS, 2000-PRESENT 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Positive relations of the 1980s and 1990s continued into the new millennium 
under the stewardship of new presidents in both Chile and Peru.  Under Toledo’s 
purview, for example, the two governments established the still ongoing (2+2) meetings 
between the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs.  Moreover, significant military 
cooperation efforts also began during his administration.  However, the domestic 
pressures Toledo faced led to renewed disputes with his Chilean neighbors by the end of 
his term.  Beginning in 2003, Chilean weapons purchases led to Peruvian programs to 
modernize their armed forces; while this did not initially derail bilateral relations, which 
continued to improve, Peruvian politicians opposed to Toledo eventually seized on this 
and other incidents for political advantage.  Moreover, by late 2005, in the run-up to the 
April 2006 presidential elections, the Peruvian Congress passed (and Toledo signed) a 
law redrawing Peru’s maritime border with Chile.  The first-place finisher in the first 
round of the elections was ultra-nationalist candidate, retired Lieutenant Colonel Ollanta 
Humala, who campaigned, in part, on disputes with Chile.  
The more moderate García, however, ultimately won the presidency in the second 
round of elections.  He made immediate attempts early in his presidency—in fact, even 
before his presidency—to establish a friendly relationship with his Chilean neighbors and 
to establish himself as a responsible alternative to Humala.  In an effort to solve the 
maritime border dispute in a way that insulates it somewhat from Peruvian political 
dynamics, García had his government submit a formal claim to the International Court of 
Justice in January 2008.  Both sides remain confident of and committed to the eventual 
ruling, though arbitration will take several years.  In the meantime, however, a renewed 
and historical dispute, an upsurge of military hardware, coupled with the emergence of a 
political party and leader within Peru devoted to exploiting nationalist passions provides 
the necessary fodder for confrontation.  Whether or not this occurs, though, remains to be 
seen. 
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Since the ups and downs in the bilateral relationship since 2000 can be explained 
primarily by changes in Peruvian domestic politics, this chapter is divided into time 
periods corresponding to the two Peruvian presidential terms since 2000.  The following 
section covers President Toledo’s administration (2001-2006), stressing the initially good 
relations and then tracking their deterioration as Chilean arms purchases and other 
incidents inflamed Peruvian passions contributed to an emerging political cleavage 
around this issue.  An increasingly weak and unpopular President Toledo was unable to 
contain these passions and the result was a 2005 law that created a new maritime border 
dispute between Chile and Peru.  The subsequent section covers the first years of the 
Alan García administration (2006-present), demonstrating how he was able to use the 
honeymoon period of his presidency to set Chilean-Peruvian relations back on a positive 
course and has consistently acted to contain the nationalist pressures created by his main 
opponent, Ollanta Humala and his Partido Nacionalista Peruano.   
B. DETERIORATION OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS: 2001-2006  
Chile began the twenty-first century in solid political and economic shape.  With 
the new democracy now ten years old, President Ricardo Lagos was free to pursue liberal 
goals.  He placed significant value in strengthening Chile’s image abroad.  Moreover, he 
was committed to strengthening Chile’s democracy while ensuring human rights.  The 
situation was not so good, however, in neighboring Peru.  President Alejandro Toledo 
assumed the presidency in the wake of political chaos, as Fujimori made a complicated 
exit from Peruvian politics.   
Nevertheless, Toledo entered an administration fraught with rampant corruption.  
While his primary goal was to eliminate that corruption and improve Peru’s economy, 
these goals were closely connected to a need to assert civilian control over the military.  
Consistent with this, the early part of his administration also saw the continuance of good 
bilateral relations with Chile.  However, despite an improved economy, Toledo’s 
domestic popularity plummeted over alleged corruption and other scandals.  Politicians, 
both ruling and in opposition, ran rampant in stirring up old wounds with Chile.  Chilean 
arms  
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purchases beginning in 2003 provided fuel for this strategy, as did a number of other 
incidents highlighted by the Peruvian media.  By the end of Toledo’s administration (and 
Lagos’ in Chile), Peru had renewed its border dispute with Chile.   
1. Initial Positive Relations (2001-2003) 
In March 2000, Ricardo Lagos assumed the reins of the Chilean presidency.  
President Lagos, Morandé suggests, “…placed an emphasis on the social and economic 
aspects of Chile’s international image, deepening the country’s political ties abroad 
through high profile presidential visits and participation in regional and hemispheric 
summits.”229  Moreover, he continues, the Lagos administration remained committed to 
strengthening democracy, protecting human rights, and promoting the process of regional 
cooperation and integration.230  Ultimately, Schneider posits, under the changes 
implemented by the two democrats before him, Lagos “would carry Chile into the 
twenty-first century in the best political shape of any country in the Western 
Hemisphere.”231  This was in stark contrast, however, to the situation faced by his 
Peruvian counterpart, Alejandro Toledo, whose presidential inauguration in Lima Lagos 
attended on July 28, 2001.232   
Alejandro Toledo came to power in the wake of controversy and political turmoil.  
He had boycotted the second round of the presidential elections in 2000 after losing the 
first round to sitting President Fujimori in a process marred by irregularities and fraud.  
Fujimori eventually called for new elections in response to international and domestic 
pressure and, soon thereafter, rushed “unceremoniously” into exile in Japan233 as a 
corruption and bribery scandal engulfed his regime.  Nonetheless, Toledo’s election in 
2001 marked the return of institutional democracy in Peru.   
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Fujimori, however, had left Peru in a sordid mess.  Jaskoski argues, for instance, 
that by the time Fujimori left office, Peru’s armed forces were “thoroughly corrupted” 
and “top-heavy” due to high-level promotions in exchange for loyalty to Fujimori’s 
regime.234  Moreover, Peru’s military had also assembled large reserves of deficient or 
outdated weapons, “obtained through arms deals that bought for the military poor 
equipment while lining the pockets of…various high-level military officers.”235  
According to Ángel Páez, for example, Fujimori’s then advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, 
had received huge bribes from arms dealers, helped by purchases made by the Armed 
Forces.  Moreover, he contends, Fujimori himself ordered what companies contracted and 
then overstated the prices.  Peruvian authorities have estimated that the more than 
U.S.$140 million found in Montesinos’ overseas accounts were bribes for the purchase of 
MiG-29 and Sukhoi-25 fighter aircraft, Mi-17 and Mi-6T helicopters, as well as phone 
spy equipment and electronic warfare systems.236  Indeed, Páez concludes, Peru’s arms 
purchases continued to increase significantly as a result of the border dispute with 
Ecuador.  Despite the signing of the peace agreement with Quito in 1998 to end the 
conflict formally, he notes, Fujimori’s administration continued spending on military 
equipment.237   
Changes in civil-military relations since Fujimori’s departure reinforced the 
government’s central goal of reducing corruption.  Jaskoski notes, for example, that since 
late 2000, “major legal reforms have greatly reduced military prerogatives,” while 
civilian control has “increased greatly.”238  Toledo’s emphasis on the economy resulted  
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five years of “sustained economic progress,” notes a Jane’s analysis, “with low inflation, 
low unemployment and average annual growth of six per cent.”  This led many to view 
Peru as a “Latin American success story.”239 
Continued cooperation with Chile served President Toledo’s related goals of 
reestablishing control over the military and focusing on the economy.  When Toledo 
assumed the presidency in July 2001, he had made the decision not to buy more 
armaments, but rather to allocate resources for programs to reduce poverty in Peru.240  He 
then visited the Chilean Congress in an official visit in August 2002,241 following his 
government’s call earlier that year to once again lower defense spending in the region in 
support of peace and increased social welfare programs.242   
In addition to continuing positive relations with Chile, the Toledo administration 
also pioneered a number of new forms of cooperation.  In July 2001, for instance, both 
governments initiated a “so-called” Permanent Committee on Political Co-ordination and 
Consultation, “with the aim of consolidating the new-found trust between the two 
countries by working more closely on matters of regional defense and the preservation of 
democracy.”243  This agreement was then executed in June 2002, at which time both the 
Ministers of Foreign Relations and Defense from Chile and Peru met for the first 
meeting.244  Among other things, José Robles Montoya notes, this “mechanism,” referred  
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to as the (2+2 meetings), “has led the establishment of a security and defense committee, 
generated talks to standardize measures of defense spending, as well as the eradication of 
mines245  in compliance with the agreements of Ottawa.”246   
In August 2004, the armies of Peru and Chile held their first meeting to establish 
joint exercises to support the civilian community.  Dubbed “Exercise Concordia,” its 
principal goal was to develop and coordinate bilateral training issues in an attempt to 
assist in confronting the results of natural disasters.247  That same month, the Commander 
of the Peruvian Army, José Antonio Graham Ayllón, visited the Chilean War College.  
This type of activity, it was noted, strengthened mutual trust and served to enhance 
cooperation between the two Armies.248  The (2+2) met again in July 2005.  During this 
meeting, the ministers formally concluded that the recent and mutual acquisition of 
weapons was to replace or upgrade aging hardware, and that “no controversies, conflicts 
or altercations” existed between each other.249   
2. Arms Modernization or Renewed Arms Race?  (2003-2005) 
At the same time, however, the foundation had been laid for an increase in the 
acquisition of arms—on both sides—and this occurred under Toledo despite his early 
resolve to shift spending away from defense.  For the most part, the renewed spending on 
weapons can accurately be characterized as a much needed modernization of forces that 
had been relatively neglected.  On the Chilean side, the purchases are grounded in a 
realist notion of deterrence; on the Peruvian side, the nationalist passion that Chilean  
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arms purchases (and other incidents) have inflamed have created a dangerous political 
dynamic that could spiral out of control (akin to an arms race) if politicians are not able 
to contain it. 
The initial push for renewed arms purchases after nearly two decades of low 
spending by both Chile and Peru came in the wake of the Peru-Ecuador conflict in 1995.  
It had been predicted early after Peru’s conflict with Ecuador that the poor performance 
of Peru’s Soviet-era arms, and the resultant losses of Peru’s largely Soviet-built 
equipment, would ultimately “lead to a push for rearmament.”250 “Replacing aircraft and 
arms will be a significant unanticipated cost” of the war, predicted Eduardo Devoto 
Acha, then general manager of the Peruvian Confederation of Private Enterprises.251  By 
December 1996, his statement proved accurate.  Peruvian Air Force sources confirmed 
that “Lima had purchased 18 Mig-29 fighters, as well as 14 Sukhois and munitions, from 
Belarus.”252  In total, the estimated package was valued between $350-400 million.  
Peruvian authorities, however, discounted accusations that such a purchase threatened the 
regional balance of power.  Authorities insisted the aircraft were simply to replace the 18 
aircraft lost or decommissioned since its brief conflict with Ecuador.  Chile’s Defense 
Minister also downplayed the acquisition, but at the same time reported the Chilean Air 
Force was “already taking steps to upgrade its capability.”253  
Analysts cautioned that Peru’s move to acquire advanced weaponry would 
encourage other Latin American states to “press Washington” to relax its ban on 
sophisticated equipment to the region.254  Indeed, by April 1997 President Clinton 
essentially ended the twenty year U.S. weapons ban to Latin America by authorizing 
American companies to sell F-16 combat aircraft to Chile.  As Chile had successfully 
transitioned to a democratic regime in 1990, the main impetus behind the Carter 
administration’s ban ceased to exist.  Analysts cite two reasons for the Clinton 
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administration’s decision to drop the ban.  The first was in response to pressure from U.S. 
weapons manufacturers, who felt they were losing revenues in a potentially expanding 
market.  The second, the Chilean press indicated, was in direct response to Peru’s 
acquisition of aircraft and munitions from Belarus.255   
However, the Peruvian Air Force faced an embarrassing situation once the 
Belarusian aircraft began to arrive, however.  The “bargained priced” aircraft had been 
purchased without a warranty or service contract.  Nor was the government of Belarus in 
a position to provide support for the aircraft.  At the same time, the Russians refused to 
provide service for aircraft purchased from a “competitor.”  Peruvian military experts 
begrudgingly quipped: “Buying those MiG-29’s from Belarus was like buying a 
refrigerator at a rummage sale then realizing after you get it home that not only is the 
warranty nontransferable but you can’t even get spare parts.”256  Nevertheless, SIPRI 
data indicates that in 1999, Russia sold another three MiG-29s to the Peruvians, in 
addition to a $117 million contract to provide service and support for the Belarusian 
aircraft.257  
In 2003, the Chilean Air Force finalized a $660 million contract to purchase ten 
F-16s from the United States for delivery in 2006-2007.  Moreover, the Chilean air force 
acquired an additional 18 “used” F-16s from the Dutch in 2005 for $100 million, also 
delivered in the 2006-2007 timeframe.258  As expected, Chilean officials as well as 
regional analysts insisted Chile was not engaging in an arms race, but rather pressing 
forward with a traditionally defensive and deterrent policy.  Analyst Eduardo Santos, for 
instance, explained the necessity to maintain a level of arms necessary to convince a 
potential adversary aggression carries more costs than benefits.  He also indicated that  
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Chile was downsizing the size of its armed forces, but making up for the “reduction” 
through better technology.  Moreover, he insisted, Chile had not replaced its outdated 
equipment since the arms embargos of the 1970s.259   
Nevertheless, by late 2003 the Peruvian government announced a plan to establish 
a permanent budget with which to upgrade its armed forces.  President Toledo had 
decided to reverse his earlier decision to limit the purchases of military arms.  The 2003 
plan called for the renovation, modernization and maintenance of transport and fighter 
aircraft, as well as ships, submarines, tanks and armored vehicles.260  Known in Peru as 
the National Defense Fund, the plan sought to fund the armed forces with revenues 
generated from Peru’s natural gas reserves.261  It is similar in scope to Chile’s “Copper’s 
Reserved Law,” designed to finance, distribute, approve and procure war material 
proposed by the Chilean armed forces.262  The law dictates that 10% of the export value 
of copper and associated products made by CODELCO, Chile’s state-run copper 
enterprise, goes to defense procurement.  As the world price of copper more than 
quadrupled between 2003 and 2006, the “Copper Law” has provided significant buying 
power to the Chilean armed forces.263  Chile’s typical annual armed forces budget, for 
example, hovered around U.S. $200 million for many years.  With high copper prices, 
Chile’s estimated 2007 defense related expenditure was as high as U.S. $5 billion.264   
Peru’s National Defense Fund has also benefited from the commodities boom.  In 
2005, the first year Peru’s military fund took effect, the military’s share was 
approximately U.S. $33 million.  This amount, Jaskoski notes, “constituted an 
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approximate 3% increase in the defense ministry’s national budget.”265  While this may 
seem insignificant, Jaskoski argues otherwise.  The U.S. $33 million “represented a 
considerable amount of potential resources for investment in weaponry and other 
materials,” he says, because annual expenditures in 2004 had been only U.S. $14 
million.266   
3. Increased Tensions and Maritime Dispute (2005-Present) 
Nationalist sentiments in both Chile and Peru are not new and the countries have 
squabbled over questions of national pride like whether the potato, the brandy-like drink 
pisco, and a popular dessert originated in Chile or Peru.  A number of these conflicts have 
long histories, with Chile banning Peruvian pisco imports in 1961 and Peru reciprocating 
thirty years later.267  However, by the mid-2000s, nationalist rhetoric and conflicts had 
intensified.  Some of this was spurred by events beyond the control of either party (e.g., 
revelations of an Ecuadorian military official on trial about Chilean arms sales to 
Ecuador) but much of it originated from the Peruvian side.  As the media and politicians 
concocted conflict scenarios related to Chilean arms purchases, public fears began to 
grow.  A 2004 University of Lima poll indicate 77 percent of Peruvians interviewed 
believe Chile is involved in an arms race.  More importantly, nearly 50 percent believe 
armed conflict with Chile is “likely,” with only 32 percent believing conflict is 
unlikely.”268  Rafael Velasquez argues that Peru’s politicians follow a dangerous recipe, 
using “old resentment towards neighboring Chile” in order to make political gains.269   
Tensions particularly intensified in 2005, in the run up to the presidential election 
of early 2006.  In January 2005, for example, two Chilean students were caught painting 
graffiti on a historic monument in the Peruvian city of Cuzco.  They were imprisoned for 
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five months—a sentence which Chilean authorities believed was excessive, given that 
Peruvian students, also involved, were not arrested.  In May of the same year, Peru’s 
government ruffled feathers with their opposition to the election of Chilean Jose Miguel 
Insulza, as secretary-general of the Organization of American States.  During this time, 
too, relations were strained by Peru’s resurgent accusation that Chile sold arms to 
Ecuador during its brief war with Peru in 1995.270  “The Peruvian government,” 
Velasquez notes, “demanded a public apology and put a [temporary] stop to the 2+2 
discussions [between the two governments].”271   
In April, Velasquez notes, Peruvian government officials were angered when they 
discovered the Chilean national airline, LAN, showed its passengers what Peru claimed 
were degrading films about Peru.  Both ruling and opposition parties (as well as the 
independents) in Peru demanded that the Ministries of Transportation, Interior and 
Foreign Affairs work together “to manage the expulsion of LAN from the country.” In 
June, Peruvian news sources reported that rising copper prices would be used by the 
Chilean armed forces to fund an “imminent plan of invasion” of Peru.  Moreover, in 
August, a Peruvian Congressman presented a Chilean flag to Peru’s Premier Elect.  This 
was an apparent form of protest for the Premier’s “alleged pro-Chilean behavior.”272  
Adding strain to the already cooling bilateral relations, in November 2005, Chilean courts 
refused to extradite Alberto Fujimori to Peru to stand trial for corruption and human 
rights abuses.273  Some time before, Fujimori had arrived unexpectedly in Santiago with 
unrealistic hopes for a renewed run at the Peruvian presidency.  
In addition to rising nationalist sentiment, the year 2005 was marked by the rapid 
decline of Toledo’s administration.  Despite his economic successes, for instance, 
Toledo’s presidency was burdened by scandal—“from revelations about extravagant 
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spending to a daughter born out of wedlock.”274  Moreover, many Peruvians became 
increasingly disappointed “with the government's inability to improve their lives even as 
the economy steadily chalked up strong growth applauded by international lenders and 
Wall Street.”275  Adding insult to injury, in mid-2005, Toledo faced impeachment related 
to forgery charges.276 
In this context, it was of little surprise that President Toledo signed a law 
redrawing the sea border with Chile in November 2005.277  The bill, which was 
unanimously approved by the Congress, gave Peru an additional 14,600 square miles of 
fishing waters at Chile’s expense.278  By the end of 2005, a spokesperson for the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs “confirmed that his country was planning to take legal action to settle 
the disputed maritime boundary.”279  While seeking to avoid confrontation and abide by 
international law, scholars suggest, Peru’s congress argued the law would ultimately 
establish a protocol through which the country would be able to negotiate a new sea 
border with Chile.  The current maritime border is a horizontal line that initiates at the 
land border and heads west, parallel across the Pacific.  The border, which Peru’s 
congress approved, however, is a south-western sloping divide which follows the two 
countries’ diagonal border into the Pacific.280 
The Chilean government has considered the legislation illegal and contends the 
lawful boundaries were established through the bilateral accords signed in the 1950s.  
Moreover, Chilean officials maintain that Peru (in both practice and through 
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documentation) has “accepted the boundary for the past 50 years.”281  As analysts 
speculated, Chilean authorities, too, dismissed Peru’s claim as a political ploy—used to 
garner domestic support for an unpopular Toledo.282  A key challenge for the new 
administration of Alan García would be to handle this dispute in a way that did not 
undermine his broader project of improving positive relations with Chile.   
C. THE RETURN OF ALAN GARCÍA: 2006-PRESENT 
In 2006, both Chile and Peru elected new presidents.  In a similar fashion to her 
predecessor, Michelle Bachelet took the reins of the Chilean presidency and was given 
the mandate to pursue continued liberal economic and political goals.  However, Peru’s 
elections were again riddled with controversy.  Alan García returned for the second time 
as Peru’s president, but he faced a significant challenge from Ollanta Humala, a former 
military officer and failed-coup leader against Fujimori.  Throughout the campaign and 
beyond, Humala fanned the nationalist passions of Peru.  García himself was running 
against the ghosts of his own failed presidency in the 1980s; to win in the second round 
of the elections, he had to convince the Peruvians who had voted for the rightist 
presidential candidate that he could govern responsibly.  And to govern effectively, 
García knew he would need to convince the international community of his newly 
responsible and progressive intentions.  Thus, when García ultimately received the 
mandate, he wasted no time in seeking peace and friendship with the Bachelet 
administration in Chile.   
Indeed, García met with Bachelet and Chilean officials prior to his inauguration, 
setting the tone for the establishment of good relations.  Yet his government insisted that 
its renewed border dispute with Chile would remain open.  Ultimately, Peru submitted its 
grievance to the International Court of Justice, where the issue awaits years of arbitration.  
Moreover, the acquisition of arms seems to have intensified of late.  Both sides argue the 
purchases are necessary to modernize an aged fleet, but the commodities boom of the last  
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decade has given both sides significant funds in their military coffers.  The mixture of 
advanced weapons and a renewed border dispute, despite executive pledges of 
cooperation and conciliation, could prove to be troublesome.  
1. Restoration of Warm Relations 
In Chile’s fourth presidential election since its return to democracy, President 
Michelle Bachelet assumed power in March 2006.  She took the reins in a nation which 
many consider to be one of the most stable governments in Latin America.  The moderate 
socialist Concertación, in power since the transition, has allowed the political system to 
establish a consensus.  As Jane’s assessment continues, “the far left is nowhere near as 
potent or extreme as in the past, while it is unlikely that even the most hard-line military 
figures would imagine that they could run the country along old authoritarian lines.”283   
In July 2006, Peruvian Alan García returned to the presidency for the second time 
following a heated campaign against former coup leader (against Fujimori) and retired 
military officer Ollanta Humala.  Of García’s competition, Humala stirred-up the most 
concern, as his foreign policy preferences were uncertain.  Throughout his campaign, for 
example, he espoused closer ties with Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Bolivia’s Evo 
Morales.  Moreover, he vowed to revise important bilateral contracts previous Peruvian 
governments had signed, as well as strengthen Peru’s military. This, COHA analysts 
suggest, “made Santiago uncomfortable.”284  Despite García’s eventual second round 
victory, however, Humala continues to stir debate and has shown few signs of retreat.   
On the other side of the political spectrum lay Lourdes Flores.  As the other main 
contender leading up to elections, she was recognized for her support of the free trade 
agreement with the United States.  This, analysts argue, “made her the obvious choice to 
be Washington’s favorite.” 285   
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García ultimately triumphed “as the most moderate of the three contenders.”286  
Indeed, he was a cautious supporter of a free trade agreement with the U.S.,287 
campaigned as a “moderate leftist,” and vowed to maintain macroeconomic stability 
initiated under Toledo’s administration.288  Moreover, during the campaign he declared 
himself the champion of peace. 289  For instance, he campaigned against the threat of “a 
new fundamentalism” in South America, citing both Chavez and Morales as “threats to 
democracy.”  Seeking a “third way” between the left and the right, García has sought to 
improve regional ties rather than to look toward Venezuela (as Humala proposed) or 
primarily toward the United States (as Flores proposed).290  García’s visit to Santiago 
after his victory, but prior to his inauguration “heralded this change of mood.”291  During 
his discussions with Bachelet, for example, García the diplomat “played down the 
importance of the two countries' maritime border dispute.”  Moreover, their meetings 
ultimately led to an important bilateral economic agreement with Chile, which the two 
governments signed later that year.292   
In July 2006, Bachelet attended García’s presidential inauguration.  Peruvian 
Defense Minister Wagner welcomed the visit, commenting that it sent a powerful 
message on behalf of both countries’ intent to “seize the moment” and forge “a very deep 
understanding.”293  Peru’s Foreign Minister argued that relations between the two nations 
had indeed “normalized.”294  And overall, their commitment to cooperation and 
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integration proved strong.  At a Council of the Americas speech that same year, García 
promised a “very deep and solid relationship with Chile.”  Moreover, he spoke of 
“brotherly and transparent links which will allow us to look forward without fear, 
mistrust or resentment.”295  In September 2006, he appointed a long-time “political 
confidant” as Peru’s ambassador to Chile.  This, analysts remarked, suggested he 
intended “to manage the relationship with Chile personally.”296  And President Bachelet 
echoed similar sentiments.  In a speech to Peruvian intellectuals, for example, Bachelet 
remarked “we need to look towards a future of peace and brotherhood, and you…have a 
lot to contribute in this effort.”297   
Amidst the warm overtures and friendly tones espoused by the newly elected 
presidents, however, Peruvian Foreign Minister Belaúnde made clear that Peru “would 
not drop its objective of revising the maritime boundaries with Chile,” stating several 
times that maritime boundaries with Chile will remain an “open issue.”298  
2. Maritime Dispute Continues 
In December 2006, the Chilean Congress signed a law creating a new 
administrative region near Chile’s border with Peru.299  According to reports, the 
proposal allegedly cut off some 19,000 square meters of Peru’s Tacna Department.  Not 
surprisingly, Peru’s government responded in January 2006, lodging an official protest 
with the Chilean government.  Officials in Peru posited that Chile was attempting to  
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redefine its maritime border to fit in a “geographical parallel,” rather than continuing the 
national borderline to the sea.  President García even recalled his ambassador from 
Santiago to discuss the matter.300   
An acute border dispute was soon averted, however, when Chile’s Constitutional 
Court deemed the measure unconstitutional.  (A Constitutional Court ruling was required 
before the law could be enacted).  According to reports, the judges argued the law was 
unconstitutional “because it defined its boundaries based on a [disputed] landmark 
between the two countries.”301  The Chilean government vowed it would respect the 
Court’s decision, while Peru’s Foreign Minister praised the ruling as favorable, for it 
eliminated “a source of dispute” between the two nations.302  Nevertheless, the issue of 
the maritime boundary had been raised again with the Chilean legislation, leading 
Foreign Minister Belaúnde in January of 2007 to hint at Peru’s willingness to submit the 
on-going dispute to the International Court of Justice for arbitration.303   
When faced with the prospect that Peru would submit its claim to the 
International Court of Justice, however, Bachelet responded:  “If Peru decides to go to the 
international justice courts, then that’s up to them.  We have a lot more to gain if we 
cooperate and look at areas of common interest than if we remain stuck in past 
agendas.”304  García responded by announcing:  “Following President Bachelet’s friendly 
declaration, the doors have been opened for us to go to The Hague.”305  In a later 
statement, García said any lawsuit submitted to The Hague would aim to solve the 
maritime issue peacefully, fairly and completely.  He also hoped to avoid damage to 
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Peru’s relations with Chile.306  However, because arbitration would likely last several 
years, it remains to be seen how the presidential relationship between Bachelet and 
García would develop. 
On January 16, 2008, Peru’s government did, in fact, present a formal claim to the 
International Court of Justice concerning its maritime frontier with Chile.307  According 
to an International Court of Justice press release, “Peru claims that ‘the maritime zones 
between Chile and Peru have never been delimited by agreement or otherwise’ and that 
accordingly, ‘the delimitation is to be determined by the Court in accordance with 
customary international law.’”308  Moreover, the government of Peru alleges that 
attempted negotiations with Chile since the 1980s have been ignored.  Because of an 
unspecified September 2004 memo sent from Chile’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to his 
Peruvian counterpart, Peru asserts that further attempts at negotiations are no longer 
feasible.309   
The Chilean government has repeatedly rejected the need for international 
arbitration, arguing that “there is nothing to discuss.”  Conversely, however, Peru expects 
a favorable ruling.310  In a March 2008 statement, Peruvian Foreign Minister Jose García 
Belaúnde announced he was satisfied with the first meeting by representatives of Peru 
and Chile at the International Court of Justice over the boundary dispute.  At the same 
time, the Chilean government remains steadfastly confident.  “We are extraordinarily 
calm on the issue,” Foreign Minister Foxley declared.  “The work plan is very clear and 
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Chile’s juridical thesis is as solid as always.”311  The International Court of Justice argues 
the delimitation will be determined in accordance with customary international law, but 
said a judgment will likely take five or six years to decide.312   
3.   Containing the Friction 
While adding longevity to an already sensitive topic, García’s submittal of the 
maritime dispute to the ICJ is fundamentally a de-escalating measure, designed to 
insulate the issue from domestic political dynamic (which would undermine bilateral 
negotiations) and turn over to objective third party.  And García has also worked hard to 
calm tensions from Peru’s military and a resilient Humala.   
In April 2007, on the anniversary of the War of the Pacific, Humala organized a 
march to Peru’s border with Chile to celebrate what he called an “act of affirmation of 
Peru’s national sovereignty.”313  As of March 2008, his Nationalist party controlled 21 
seats in the Congress, and his appeal to poorer Peruvians in the southern and western 
highlands “makes him a potentially serious threat to García’s ability to govern 
effectively.”314  Moreover, he continues to support the nationalization of key industries, 
remains hostile to foreign investment and free trade and has exhibited a weak 
commitment to democratic governance.315  And as recently as March 2009, Humala was 
still inciting nationalistic passions.  A trade pact agreement went into effect between 
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opposition parties in a campaign “to convince Peruvians a free trade deal with Chile is a 
bad thing.”  Humala’s opposition movement plans to hold a series of meetings in the 
south of Peru, where García’s administration is “highly unpopular.”316  
Arms acquisitions continue to inspire mistrust, even among some members of 
García’s cabinet.  Chile’s F-16 purchases, for example, have been a renewed cause of 
concern in Peru since they began arriving in 2006.  Peruvian Foreign Minister Belaúnde 
was quoted as saying “the purchase of this fleet affects the region’s strategic and military 
balance.”317  All of Chile’s recently acquired F-16s are assigned to air bases in Iquique 
and Antofagasta—Chile’s northern most air bases and those closest to Peru.  
Peruvian Mister of Defense Allan Wagner seemed to be more in line with 
García’s efforts to show restraint toward Chile, announcing in August 2006 that Peru 
intended to scale back on it military hardware acquisitions.  “We're not looking for 
balance (with the Chileans).  How could we balance with a country that has so much 
weaponry purchased with money that has fallen from the skies because of high copper 
prices?” he asked, referring to the Chilean armed forces Copper Law.  Wagner then 
added that “[Peru has] some shopping to do, but we are not talking about large weapons 
systems...”318  
By September 2008, however, the pendulum had swung back, as Peru’s Vice 
President introduced a bill to congress which proposed to expand Peru’s National 
Defense Fund in order to strengthen and modernize Peru’s armed forces.  Vice-president 
Luis Giampietri, who is also a retired Vice Admiral, said the initiative would be “very 
important to give the armed forces a prospect for sustainable modernization” as well as 
provide “sufficient capacity to create a deterrent.”  He also argued that the bill would 
“reduce the imbalance that exists in the field of defense with other countries in the 
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region.”  The proposal has been met with mixed support within government circles, but 
was purportedly endorsed by Defense Minister Antero Flores Araoz.319  And to heighten 
tensions, Peru’s most recent procurements are occurring under an increasing lack of 
transparency.  The National Defense Fund, Jaskoski posits, “was spent with very little 
oversight.”320  Angel Páez, concurs.  Peru’s recent announcement in 2008 to purchase 
arms with a price tag of U.S. $514 million, he argues, “has been initiated under the same 
provisions of state secrecy employed by the Fujimori administration.”321   
In mid-2008, the Chilean government announced its intention to purchase an 
imaging satellite with both civilian and military applications.  According to press reports, 
the satellite will be able to receive multi spectral images of its neighbors, allowing Chile 
the capability to monitor the surrounding territories and sea surface.322  And as recently 
as October 2008, Chilean officials expressed their intentions to purchase another 16 
refurbished F-16s from the Dutch Air Force, bringing their total to 44 advanced combat 
aircraft.  The reported deal reportedly would cost more than $170 million, with delivery 
of the aircraft expected to begin in 2009.  Although early reports indicated the aircraft 
would be stationed in the south, near Chile’s border with Argentina, the continued arms 
purchases continue to create tension with Peru   
This continued potential for anger and suspicion is perhaps best demonstrated 
with recent events.  In September 2008, the Chief of Staff of the Chilean Army, General 
Oscar Izurieta Ferrer, made an official visit to Peruvian army headquarters, where he met 
the commanding general, Major General Edwin Donayre Gotzch.  The two generals 
attended a military ceremony, where they highlighted the need for military leaders to 
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foster cooperation and harmony between the two nations.323  Yet only two months later, 
Peru’s government canceled a trip by its defense minister to neighboring Chile after 
Peru's army chief “was shown making anti-Chilean statements online.”  According to 
reports, General Donayre was caught saying that “Chileans should not be allowed into 
[Peru], and that if they did enter they would have to leave in ‘boxes’ and ‘plastic 
bags.’”324  A Chilean spokesman prompted the cancelled visit commenting that it “might 
be inopportune given the circumstances.”  His remarks, too, fanned the flames of 
controversy.  Peru’s President García, for example, said his country “did not accept 
pressure or orders from anybody outside of Peru,” while Foreign Minister Jose Antonio 
García Belaúnde said, “Frankly, when one is 'uninvited,' it's not very courteous.”325 
And the harsh words continued into 2009.  In March, Peruvian General Donayre 
(now retired) was caught again, spouting off against Chile.  The day before Peru was 
scheduled to launch its legal action at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, 
Donayre stirred up tensions by suggesting Chile was preparing “a military adventure” 
against Peru.  Donayre referred to the comments of Chile’s previous foreign minister, 
Alejandro Foxley, who had said Chile would use “every means at its disposal” to oppose 
the Peruvian maritime claim. Donayre was thus questioning why Foxley did not 
specifically rule out military action.326  Chile’s foreign minister, Mariano Fernández, 
dismissed his comments, saying “We haven’t the time and it does not matter to us.”  
Nevertheless, on the following day, the commander of Chile’s navy said that his service 
was “well prepared” for any eventuality.  Admiral Codina’s comments to a Chilean radio 
station were pointed, the article noted.  Moreover, Codina’s comments, it argued, further 
“stoked up simmering bilateral tensions.”327 
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In response to these tensions, government officials on both sides have attempted 
to play down the risks.  Following Peru’s submission of the maritime dispute to the 
International Court of Justice in January 2008, military leaders on both sides assured that 
military relations had not been affected,328 and officials in both Peru and Chile have ruled 
out military conflict over the new law.  Nevertheless, the risk of incidents between 
Peruvian fishing boats and the Chilean Navy remain.  According to reports, for example, 
Peruvian fishing boats often “stray” in disputed territory, yet leave when directed by the 
Chilean Navy patrols.  Because of this new law, however, analysts contend the fishermen 
may be less willing to leave.  This, they argue, could pose a more serious challenge to the 
Chilean Navy, citing the potential risk of inflicting damage to a Peruvian boat or even an 
accidental sinking.329  The concern exists, despite the continued participation of both 
navies in multinational exercises.  For instance, the navies of Chile and Peru participated 
together with Ecuador, Colombia and the United States in UNITAS 2008.330  Moreover, 
a second phase of the combined exercise “Concordia 2008” took place in July 2008 with 
a ceremony at the Chilean War College.  A “third phase” of the training exercise is 
expected sometime in the future.331 
D. ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 2000-PRESENT 
As the new millennium opened, democracy once again returned to Peru.  At the 
same time, Chile was celebrating some ten years of solid democratic rule.  Thus, for the 
first time in my analysis of the development of Chile-Peru relations, both nations were 
under democratic rule during the period of study.  The overtures of peace and cooperation 
that followed, extended to Chile by both Toledo and García, would suggest Doyle’s 
notion of democratic peace—that “when the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect 
their governments, wars become impossible.”332  However, arguably this was not the 
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case.  While the period 1980 to 2000 witnessed an era of peace and reconciliation, the 
2000s have not.  Initial inroads made between Toledo and Chile’s Lagos, for instance, 
soon gave way to a newly posited maritime border claim.  Though García attempted to 
resolve these renewed tensions initially, they have since intensified.  Moreover, the 
tensions are increasingly exacerbated by an ever increasing acquisition of military arms 
by both Chile and Peru. 
The shifting dynamic of Chilean-Peruvian relations since 2000 is largely 
explained by changes in Peru.  Since the transition to democracy in 1990, the Chilean 
position has remained constant.  The center-left coalition of parties, the Concertación, has 
ruled the country since the transition, pursuing liberal economic and political goals 
designed to strengthen civilian control of the military and Chile’s image abroad, advance 
democratic ideals, and ensure past human rights violations were properly addressed.  The 
strong institutional powers that the Chilean president enjoys, and the disciplined majority 
support the Concertación parties provide in Congress, have allowed the ruling coalition to 
control the agenda, resist populist temptations, and govern responsibly. 
In contrast, Peruvian executives face a much more fluid political landscape, which 
affects both the agenda they pursue and their ability to pursue it.  When Toledo came to 
power in 2001, his focus lay in protecting Peru’s economy, while at the same time 
cleaning up the corruption that flourished under Fujimori.  As a democrat, too, he was 
largely concerned with normalizing relations with his neighbors. Moreover, in the years 
following Fujimori’s exit, civilian control over Peru’s military was increasingly 
asserted.333  Thus, Toledo was not restricted by the armed forces to act on his 
preferences.  As a result, important bilateral initiatives, such as the (2+2) meetings soon 
emerged.  However, when Toledo’s popularity began to plummet over scandal and 
charges of corruption, the situation changed.  In fact, Toledo’s actions toward Chile were 
largely influenced and restrained by the nationalist sentiment espoused by both ruling and 
opposing politicians.   
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García’s administration, however, has been able to garner more domestic support.  
In pursuing his “middle road” tactics, García has also chosen to take the maritime border 
dispute to the International Court of Justice.  It is important to note, however, that the ICJ 
is, indeed, a de-escalating move on behalf of García; García has done an excellent job in 
managing tensions thus far–from the public, Humala, military, even some within his own 
cabinet–because economic relations with Chile and a moderate image is so important to 
him.  Moreover, if nationalism wins out, so does Humala.  However, the situation is 
unstable.   
And complicating matters is the continued acquisition of military hardware by 
both Chile and Peru.  Indeed, it is easy to construe the continued purchases as a newly 
emerging arms race.  However, at the same time, experts argue that both countries are 
simply refurbishing outdated military arsenals.  Indeed, both have defense finance 
provisions linked to commodities. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Thus, contemporary relations between Chile and Peru are at a critical juncture.  
Throughout the decade, Chilean policy has been straightforward.  Both Lagos and 
Bachelet have operated in an unconstrained environment, free to implemented liberal 
policies.  The Peruvian executives, however, remain constrained.  Toledo was forced by 
his administration to reinvent a conflict with Chile in order to take pressure off his failing 
regime.  The momentum has continued under García, despite his greater popularity.  
Nevertheless, García remains constrained by his opposition—specifically the nationalist 
party headed by Humala, who continues to rely on nationalist grievances to achieve 
support.  García, however, has attempted to bridge both ends of the spectrum, however, 
by submitting the maritime dispute to the ICJ.  While he lacks the support to deal with the 
issue domestically, the ICJ will at least demonstrate Peru’s resolve to settle the issue.   
Where problems may arise, however, is if the recent military hardware purchases 
by both sides gets intrinsically linked to the dispute.  Evidence of this is already 
developing in the statements of Peru’s former army chief and even Chile’s current Navy 
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V. CONCLUSION 
It has been nearly a decade since democracy has made its return to Peru.  
Moreover, the robust Chilean governance, which returned in 1990 continues to function 
as an example for all of Latin America.  Yet currently, there are significant signs of an 
increase in bilateral tensions confronting these two nations.  Foremost on the agenda is 
Peru’s maritime dispute with Chile, which is currently awaiting arbitration at the 
International Court of Justice.  In fact, opening arguments are occurring at the time of this 
writing.   
Concurrent with the maritime dispute is the rapid acquisition of military 
hardware.  During the past decade, increased commodity prices have significantly 
contributed to defense fund related programs in both states.  As a result, the armed forces 
in Chile and Peru have increasing funds with which to acquire advanced military 
equipment.  This has included fighter aircraft, and navy vessels, as well as advanced 
armor for ground operations.  With respect to Chile, the acquisition of military equipment 
even includes satellite imagery capability. 
Indeed, Peru and Chile share a common history fraught with conflict.  Two 
nineteenth century wars, fought largely over natural resources, resulted in significant 
territorial and resource gain for Chile, but as Peru’s expense.  Following the 1879-1883 
War of the Pacific, a peace treaty settling the dispute was not enacted until 1929.  
Moreover, not all of the actions mandated under the Treaty of Lima were enacted until 
some 70 years later.  Arguably, this was cause for dissent.  Thus, for more than a century, 
the two states have had valid reason for lasting grievances. 
Today, however, democratic traditions have taken root in both states.  Since the 
wave of democracy swept through Latin America in the 1970s, for example, Cuba 
remains the only non-democratic regime in the region.  Moreover, the post-Cold War era 
has led to increased integration for all nations, as well as an increase in security 
cooperation.  Indeed, Peru and Chile are no exception.  Throughout this period, numerous 
grievances in the region were laid to rest.  Chile and Argentina, for example, have 
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resolved all but one minor territorial claim.  Moreover, Peru and Ecuador settled their 
long-standing border dispute in 1998.  In order to understand the trend in warming 
relations throughout the region over the past few decades, several liberal theories have 
been advanced.  Both the Democratic and Economic Peace theories have argued that 
democratization and integration ultimately lead to increased security cooperation.  
However, as I have illustrated throughout this thesis, neither theory has sufficiently 
accounted for the dynamic relationship that continues to exist between Chile and Peru.  
Indeed, boundary disputes have reemerged in the past several years, and remain a 
potential trigger for the continued increase in military hardware carried out by both states 
since the 1990s.  
Thus, the goal of this thesis was to illustrate the deficiencies in the traditional 
theories with respect to Chile and Peru.  To effectively demonstrate this, I drew largely 
on the works of Arturo Sotomayor and Randall Parish.  Specifically, I integrated the 
insights of the democratic peace and economic integration literature into a more 
comprehensive political economy framework for understanding the preferences of key 
actors with regard to security cooperation.  Moreover, I looked at the actors’ ability to act 
on their preferences.  Throughout, I focused on three actors—the executive, the military, 
and to a lesser extent, the legislatures.  I found, for example, that civil-military relations 
are important not only for shaping executive incentives to pursue security cooperation (as 
Sotomayor argues), but also as a factor affecting the executive’s ability to act on his or 
her preferences.  Likewise, the makeup and incentives inherent of the legislature (both 
ruling and in opposition) are also, at times, a key aspect of the president’s ability to act.  
This was evidenced specifically with respect to Peru.   
Throughout, I examined several aspects of international relations.  For instance, I 
looked at the ability of the two states to solve border disputes.  I also examined state 
efforts to limit the purchase of advances arms.  Moreover, I observed the use of mutual 
confidence building measures as tools to foster bilateral and regional cooperation efforts.  
The analysis focused on three distinct eras of bilateral relations.  The first period, 1968 to 
1980 enveloped the military regime in Peru.  This included the initial left-leaning regime 
of Velasco, followed by the rightist Morales regime.  Moreover, this era covered Chile’s 
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transition from democracy (under Frei) to a period of democratic socialism under 
Allende.  The period also included the initial consolidation of power in Chile by General 
Augusto Pinochet.   
Indeed, during this era the traditional liberal theories of cooperation were 
irrelevant.  Both economic integration and democratic governance were nearly 
nonexistent.  I found, however, that during this era the bilateral relationship of Chile and 
Peru was driven by a realist notion of balance of power.  In this arena where states must 
rely on themselves for protection, a “tit-for-tat” acquisition of arms occurred throughout 
the decade.  Power politics was also evidenced with respect to issues of territory.  Chile 
sought to retain the territory it conquered in the War of the Pacific, while at times, 
Peruvian leaders expressed their desire to reclaim what was once Peru.  For most of the 
analysis, both regimes were military in nature.  Thus, all aspects of governance were 
consolidated.  The executive controlled the military.  Other actors, if any, were 
insignificant or marginalized.  Thus, the executive was unfettered in acting on his 
preferences. 
Nevertheless, the elements of realist competition were tempered by two important 
factors.  These included the balance of identity phenomenon, as well as the nontraditional 
use of confidence building measures.  In borrowing from Barletta and Trinkunas, I 
posited that like-minded regimes evidenced increased efforts to cooperate.  The military 
regime of Velasco was leftist in its approach to governance.  Thus, when a socialist was 
elected to office in Chile, cautious hopes for an ideological alliance emerged.  Though 
arms were being acquired under both regimes, it was not until Pinochet gained 
ascendency that the rhetoric increased.  Tacit cooperation, too, was evidenced late in the 
era via bilateral participation in Operation Condor.  Flare-ups did indeed occur, but were 
largely outside the ability of Morales to control.  Both regimes also employed confidence 
building measures.  Their use demonstrated the need for realist actors to defend their 
interests, while at the same time preventing an escalation leading to armed conflict. 
The second period of analysis, 1980 to 2000, reflected a significant improvement 
in bilateral relations.  It was during this time that first Peru, then Chile began the process 
of re-democratization.  In contrast to the theories that predict an increase in conflict 
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during democratization, this era revealed that executives in new democracies had strong 
incentives to resolve disputes with their neighbors—both as part of a broader effort to 
reassert civilian control of the military establishment and to restore legitimacy to their 
newly emerging regimes.  It is also important to note that this occurred across the lines of 
democracy, reaching into authoritarian regimes. 
In the 1980s, for example, a newly democratized Peru led cooperation efforts with 
respect to an authoritarian Chile.  Efforts began with modest efforts of Belaúnde to 
initiate a program of normalization.  Cooperation efforts increased, however, during 
García’s first term in office, as he actively sought to subordinate Peru’s military.  At the 
same time, I argue, Pinochet’s regime had incentive to welcome Peru’s advances.  The 
Pinochet regime was increasingly isolated in the 1980s and sought to prove itself within 
the international community.  Cooperation with an historic enemy was a means with 
which to establish legitimacy. 
In the 1990s, the tables were turned.  Democracy came to Chile at the same time 
its institutions were increasingly repressed in Peru.  Nevertheless, Chile’s new democrats 
had incentive to seek cooperation in conjunction with efforts to legitimize their regime 
and subordinate a powerful military.  Indeed, Chile’s military had retained significant 
prerogatives into the 1990s.  Nevertheless, the executives were not constrained in their 
cooperation efforts with Peru.  By the end of the decade, attrition had taken its toll and 
Chile’s military regime was somewhat weakened.  However, at the same time, Fujimori 
in Peru had incentive to accept overtures of Peace.  Fujimori too, sought to increase his 
administration’s legitimacy.  Cooperation with his neighbors proved a means to 
accomplish this.  Efforts to solve lingering disputes with Chile failed in the early part of 
the decade, however, because Fujimori did not possess enough domestic support.  By the 
end of the decade, however, Peru had ended its grievance with Ecuador.  Fujimori also 
possessed the needed capacity to resolve its border issues with Chile.  
In the new millennium, the democratic tradition was restored in Peru.  Moreover, 
democratic governance in Chile reached near consolidation.  Indeed, this period 
represented the first instance in which both regimes were headed by democratically 
elected executives.  At the same time, this era also represented a time during which many 
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of the lasting vestiges of military prerogatives were successfully eliminated.  As such, the 
executives in Peru and Chile were not constrained by the armed forces to act on their 
preferences.  However, despite the initial hope for increased peace and cooperation in the 
age of mutual democracy, such has not been the case.  As the new decade progresses, 
indeed, tensions seem to have increased. 
Throughout the 2000s and today, the Chilean position with respect to foreign 
policy has remained remarkably consistent.  Following in the footsteps of her 
predecessors, Bachelet has been empowered to pursue liberal goals.  Moreover, there is 
little doubt to assume that subsequent administrations will diverge from Chile’s 
successful policies in the future. Thus, the driving force behind the contemporary 
dynamics of Chile-Peru relations throughout this decade is, and will likely continue be, 
primarily reflected in the preferences and strengths of Peru’s actors—specifically that of 
the executive with respect to Peruvian politicians. During this era, I argue, Peruvian 
politician have capitalized on Peru’s historic grievance with Chile in order to deflect 
attention away from domestic issues.  This was first manifest late in Toledo’s regime as 
his popularity at home sank to very low levels.  Despite the initiation of significant 
confidence building measures such as the (2+2) meetings, the Peruvian administration 
overwhelmingly passed a law, which redefines Peru’s sea border with Chile.  This upset a 
de facto observance of the border, which had been respected for more than 50 years. 
García, however, has wielded a more popular administration since assuming 
power.  Nevertheless, the tension with regard to the border claim has intensified.  Indeed, 
García sought to implement rapprochement with Chile early in his tenure, holding 
meetings in Santiago prior to his inauguration.  Nevertheless, Peru’s government has 
insisted its grievance with Chile will remain open.  García, nevertheless, assumed the 
presidency as a moderate.  His closest competitor, Humala, had exemplified Peru’s nature 
to use nationalist rhetoric to gain political authority.  Thus, García was constrained, I 
argue, by his opposition to keep the maritime issue at the forefront of his foreign policy.  
To retract the law enacted under Toledo, if passed, would surely incite the nationalist 
rhetoric of Humala.  Indeed, García has sought use of the International Court of Justice as 
the best mechanism with which to de-escalate the situation and resolve the dispute.  As 
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democratic regimes, both sides remain confident of the court’s eventual ruling, but at the 
same time will mutually respect the court’s decision.  However, arbitration is not 
expected for a matter of years.  Thus, it remains to be seen how he dynamics of this 
relationship will develop. 
As I have cautioned, however, the continued acquisition of military hardware by 
both Chile and Peru will, for the immediate future, ensure the situation remains 
complicated.  As coarse statements increasingly fly from both sides of the border, stirring 
nationalist emotions to a fury, a potential threat lies in linking the increased acquisition of 
arms to the maritime situation.  Peruvian politicians have already stepped up their 
rhetoric.  This includes comments made by Peru’s former army chief General Donayre, 
who is also a candidate in Peru’s forthcoming presidential elections.  If such rhetoric is 
allowed to expand in the political arena, the future of Chile-Peru relations could be 
worrisome at best. 
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